[Annotated] A new initiative aims to modernise global trading rules

It will pit the world's big powers against^[각주:1] each other

"SATISFACTION GUARANTEED!" promises the seller of "The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization" (WTO). The magic of e-commerce means that the doorstopper^[각주:2] can be exported from America to Tajikistan for a cool $35.95 (plus shipping). A new initiative on digital trade at the WTO strives to add to the laws and policies described within. But far from increasing general satisfaction, this plan is controversial. 

At first glance, it is hard to see why. On January 25th representatives of 76 WTO members gathered at the annual shindig in^[각주:3] Davos announced plans to negotiate new rules covering "trade-related aspects of electronic commerce". Compared with the trade talks between America and China that restarted this week in Washington, this venture seems positively collegial^[각주:4]. It makes sense: global trade rules were written when cloud computing was the stuff of science fiction. And what better way to show the value of the WTO, just as President Donald Trump is busy undermining it?

But a closer look reveals conflict. Though the 76 members account for 90% of global trade, they are a minority of WTO members. Many developing countries claim that tighter e-commerce rules would tie national regulators' hands and that the issue is a distraction from others they care about more, such as limiting rich countries' agricultural subsidies. 

The plan is to sidestep such complaints^[각주:5], which have blocked agreement at the WTO for years. Instead of getting all members to sign up to a multi-lateral deal, a like-minded group^[각주:6] will set rules among themselves. Hold-outs^[각주:7], like India and South Africa, will not be able to block progress if their demands are not met. The cost is the legitimacy that a broader group would generate - and the fact that non-signatories^[각주:8] will free-ride on any deal^[각주:9], gaining from others' commitments, without making any themselves. 

Further battles lie ahead^[각주:10]. "Countries don't have a shared definition of what they're negotiating," complains Susan Aaronson of George Washington University. The WTO defines e-commerce as the "production, distribution, marketing, sale or delivery of goods and services by electronic means." That is broad. 

An agreement could include regulations covering spam emails or rules helping digital purchases zip through customs. It could reach deep into members' domestic regulations to cover cybersecurity or the protection of personal data. It could prevent barriers to cross-border data flows, or ban requirements to store citizens' data on local servers. Every two years WTO members renew a promise not to tax digitally-provided goods, such as films from Netflix. A new deal could make that permanent. 

American negotiators would like all of the above. Their technology firms benefit from data flowing freely, which helps them to train algorithms and generate sales. Data-localization is^[각주:11] expensive, and could weaken security by giving hackers more targets. And, obviously, they would rather their digital sales were not taxed. 

This powerful lobby group's ambitions have already been enshrined in trade deals^[각주:12] away from the WTO. The United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), which America's Congress is supposed to ratify later this year^[각주:13], bans customs duties on digital products. So does the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which was negotiated by 12 countries, including America, and revived by the others when Mr Trump pulled America out. The TPP bars governments from forcing companies to hand over their source code, and the USMCA goes further by including algorithms, too. Both ban data-localization requirements. 

Many worry that American technology companies are using trade rules to neuter national regulators^[각주:14]. In theory, there are exceptions to the rules regarding data localization and technology transfer. But critics fear that governments will be wary of^[각주:15] invoking those exceptions^[각주:16], and that arbiters at the WTO will side with companies. 

It will be hard to get European negotiators on board with some of this. European law treats privacy as a fundamental human right, and the free flow of data as secondary; the Americans (and Japanese) start from the premise that data should flow and only then consider exceptions on privacy grounds. Still, a recent deal between the European Union and Japan suggests the differences may not be insurmountable^[각주:17]. 

The biggest fight will be with China. Its government views data as an issue of sovereignty, and trade in data as a national-security matter. Chinese representatives reportedly tried to narrow the scope of the talks^[각주:18], threatening not to participate. They joined in the end, presumably deciding that it would be better to have influence over any new rules rather than see standards that could become global set without them. Other countries see little value in rules that enshrine China's draconian approach to data^[각주:19], but also know the value of having a country of China's size involved. 

American administrations have tried to resolve these differences in the past. The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, a proposed deal between America and the EU, was supposed to cover the two sides' differing approaches to data^[각주:20]. Together with the TPP, it was meant to draw China into a less hostile regulatory pattern^[각주:21]. 

Americans are once again working with other countries to pull in China. In December Roberto Azevêdo, the WTO's head, described American efforts on e-commerce as "very active". But negotiators may be short of bargaining power. Pluri-lateral negotiations on^[각주:22] narrow topics at least mean that China cannot block all discussion. But they also remove the opportunities to bargain unrelated^[각주:23] concessions against each other^[각주:24], which is how trade negotiators reach consensus. This initiative could be the success the beleaguered WTO desperately needs^[각주:25]. Or it could be another demonstration of its weakness^[각주:26]. 

1. pit ; 1-a. 움푹 들어가게 하다, 구멍을 내다, 흠집을 내다 ;; 2-b. <사람·지혜·힘 등을> 겨루게 하다, 경쟁시키다 ((against)) ;; [VERB] If two opposing things or people are pitted against one another, they are in conflict. [본문으로]
2. doorstopper ; [명사] 문짝이 열려 있도록 괴는 쐐기꼴 멈추개; (문짝이 받히지 않도록 벽·바닥에 대는) 고무를 씌운 돌기 ;; [Noun] A doorstop: a device for halting the motion of a door. [본문으로]
3. shindig ; [명사] (비격식) 떠들썩한 파티 ;; [NOUN] A shindig is a large, noisy, enjoyable party. ;; 미국∙영국 [ˈʃɪndɪɡ] [본문으로]
4. collegial ; 유의어 COLLEGIATE ;; 4. 단체 조직의, 조합의; 동료 각자가 평등하게 권한을 가지는. ;; 미국식 [kəlí:dƷəl,-dƷiəl] 영국식 [-dƷiəl] [본문으로]
5. sidestep ; (-pp-) 1. [타동사][VN] (대답·문제 처리를) 회피하다 ;; [VERB] If you sidestep a problem, you avoid discussing it or dealing with it. [본문으로]
6. like-minded ; [형용사] 생각[뜻]이 비슷한 ;; [ADJ] Like-minded people have similar opinions, ideas, attitudes, or interests. [본문으로]
7. hold-out ; 인내, 저항, 거부집단 [본문으로]
8. non-signatory; ; [Noun] One who is not a signatory. ;; signatory ; (pl. -ies) ~ (to/of sth) (격식) (공식 합의서의) 서명인, 조인국 ;; [NOUN] The signatories of an official document are the people, organizations, or countries that have signed it. ;; 미국식 [-tɔːri] 영국식 [ˈsɪɡnətri] [본문으로]
9. free ride ; [구어] 무임승차; 불로 소득 ;; 동사로 활용한것을 확인 [본문으로]
10. lie ahead [in store] ; (위험 따위가) 기다리고 있다, 앞에 놓여 있다 ;; 앞으로 전개될 것이다 [본문으로]
11. data localization ; Data localization is the act of storing data on any device that is physically present within the borders of a specific country where the data was generated. Free flow of digital data, especially data which could impact government operations or operations in a region, is restricted by some governments. [본문으로]
12. enshrine ; [타동사][VN] [주로 수동태로] ~ sth (in sth) (격식) (법·권리 등을 특히 문서상으로) 소중히 간직하다[모시다] ;; [VERB] If something such as an idea or a right is enshrined in something such as a constitution or law, it is protected by it. ;; 미국∙영국 [ɪnˈʃraɪn] [본문으로]
13. ratify ; -fied) 1. 비준하다, 재가하다; 승인하다, 인가하다 ;; [VERB] When national leaders or organizations ratify a treaty or written agreement, they make it official by giving their formal approval to it, usually by signing it or voting for it. [본문으로]
14. neuter ; 2. [타동사] (못마땅함) 효과를 못 내게 하다, 무력화시키다 ;; 미국식 [ˈnuːtə(r)] 영국식 [ˈnjuːtə(r)] [본문으로]
15. be wary of ; ~을 조심하다 , 경계하다 [본문으로]
16. invoke ; 1. [타동사] ~ sth (against sb) (법·규칙 등을) 들먹이다[적용하다] ;; 2. [타동사] (근거·이유로 인물·이론·예 등을) 들다[언급하다] ;; [VERB] If you invoke a law, you state that you are taking a particular action because that law allows or tells you to. [본문으로]
17. insurmountable ; [형용사] (격식) 곤경·문제 등이 대처[극복]할 수 없는 ; 유의어 insuperable ; [ADJ] A problem that is insurmountable is so great that it cannot be dealt with successfully. ; 미국식 [-sərˈm-] 영국식 [ˌɪnsəˈmaʊntəbl] [본문으로]
18. narrow ; 1. 좁히다, 좁게 하다; 가늘게 하다 ;; 2. 한정[제한]하다 [본문으로]
19. draconian ; (격식) (법·처벌 등이) 매우 엄격한, 가혹한 ; [어원스토리] 범죄 행위에 대해 엄한 처벌, 특히 사형을 주장했던 고대 아테네 입법자 Draco에서 유래. ;; [ADJ] Draconian laws or measures are extremely harsh and severe. ; 미국식 [-ˈkoʊ-] 영국식 [drəˈkəʊniən] [본문으로]
20. different 말고 differing을 사용한 것을 확인 [본문으로]
21. regulatory ; [형용사] (주로 명사 앞에 씀) (산업·상업 분야의) 규제[단속]력을 지닌 [본문으로]
22. plurilateral ; [Adjective] Involving several parties. ;; pluri- [연결형] ; ((연결형)) 「다수(多數)」의 뜻 (multi-) ; several, many ;; 미국∙영국 [plúəri] [본문으로]
23. unrelated ; 1. 관련[관계] 없는 ; 유의어 unconnected ;; [ADJ] [oft ADJ to n] If one thing is unrelated to another, there is no connection between them. You can also say that two things are unrelated. [본문으로]
24. concession ; 1. [C, U] (언쟁을 끝내거나 상황을 개선하기 위한) 양보[양해] ; 참조 concede ;; [NOUN] [oft N to/from n] If you make a concession to someone, you agree to let them do or have something, especially in order to end an argument or conflict. [본문으로]
25. beleaguered ; [형용사] 1. (격식) 사면초가에 몰린 ;; 2. (적에게) 포위된 ;; [ADJ] [usu ADJ n] A beleaguered person, organization, or project is experiencing a lot of difficulties, opposition, or criticism. ;; 미국식 [-ɡərd] 영국식 [bɪˈliːɡəd] [본문으로]
26. demonstration ; 1. 논증, 입증, 증명 ; 예증(例證)(이 되는 것), 실례, 증거. ;; 2. (논리) 논증(proof). [본문으로]