[Annotated] How to fix failed states

Donald Trump should not abandon Afghanistan 

Eight years ago Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart wrote a book called "Fixing Failed States". Now Mr Ghani is in a position to follow his own advice. He is the president of Afghanistan, a state that failed in the 1990s and could fail again.

State failure causes untold^[각주:1] misery. Broadly defined, it is the main reason poor countries are poor. Its chief cause^[각주:2] is not geography, climate or culture, but politics. Some countries build benign, efficient institutions that foster economic growth^[각주:3]; others build predatory ones that retard^[각주:4] it. South Sudan is an extreme example of predation^[각주:5]. Its politics consist of warlords^[각주:6] fighting over^[각주:7] oil money. The warlords also stir up^[각주:8] tribal^[각주:9] animosity ^[각주:10]as a tool to recruit more militiamen^[각주:11]. The state makes Big Men rich while ordinary folk subsist on^[각주:12] food aid. 

Ashes to assets 

Afghanistan must overcome several hurdles^[각주:13] to avoid the same fate. Since Barack Obama pulled out^[각주:14] most of the NATO troops supporting the government, the Taliban, an Islamist militia, has recaptured parts of the country. In the past year it has been fought to^[각주:15] a stalemate^[각주:16]. But were Donald Trump to withdraw^[각주:17] the remaining^[각주:18] American forces, the jihadists would probably take over^[각주:19] again. The last time they were in power^[각주:20] they banned female education, crushed gay people with bulldozers and hosted Osama bin Laden, so the stakes are high^[각주:21].

As a first step, Mr Trump should maintain at least the current level of air support^[각주:22], training and funding for the Afghan army. He should also ramp pressure on^[각주:23] Pakistan to stop letting the Taliban use its territory as a rear base^[각주:24]. (Pakistan insists it is doing all it can; no one believes it.)

Foreign military support can buy time for a fragile state to build the right kind of institutions. This worked in Sierra Leone and Liberia, two war-scorched^[각주:25] African nations where UN peacekeepers^[각주:26] gave new governments breathing-space^[각주:27] to start afresh^[각주:28]. It worked in Colombia, too, where American support helped the government drive back^[각주:29] the drug-dealing leftist insurgents^[각주:30] of the FARC and force them to the negotiating table, producing a historic^[각주:31] peace deal in 2016. However - and this is the lesson of Iraq - good government cannot be imposed from outside^[각주:32]. National leaders have to want it and work for it, overcoming stiff resistance^[각주:33] from the militia^[각주:34] bosses and budget-burgling^[각주:35] ministers who benefit from its absence. 

Mr Ghani has the right priorities. First, establish a degree of physical security^[각주:36]. Next, try to entrench^[각주:37] the rule of law. Both are hard in a nation where suicide-bombers kill judges and warlords grow rich^[각주:38] from the poppy^[각주:39] trade. Yet he has made progress. The Afghan army is becoming more capable^[각주:40]. Tax collection^[각주:41] has improved, despite the economic shock of the American troop drawdown^[각주:42]. Corruption, though still vast, is being curbed^[각주:43] in some areas. 

This is not a side issue^[각주:44]. If ordinary Afghans see the state as predatory^[각주:45], they will not defend it against the Taliban. Right now the jury is out: most Afghans are terrified of^[각주:46] the Taliban, but trust in the government is low, too. Mr Ghani needs time to implement his reforms^[각주:47]; donors must be patient. 

After a civil war ends somewhere, Western donors often pour in more money^[각주:48] than the damaged state can absorb, and pull back^[각주:49] when results disappoint. NGOs parachute in^[각주:50], poach^[각주:51] the best staff with higher wages and form a costly parallel state^[각주:52] that will one day pack up^[각주:53] and go. This undermines national institutions. It would be better if donors scaled up^[각주:54] their largesse^[각주:55] gradually, channeled it through^[각주:56] national coffers^[각주:57] where possible and stuck around^[각주:58] for the long run^[각주:59].

None of this will succeed if a country's leaders do not want it to. In South Sudan neither of ^[각주:60]the two main warlords is^[각주:61] interested in nation-building^[각주:62], so donors have no one to work with. But in Kabul they do. They should not cut and run.

1. untold ; [형용사] (명사 앞에만 씀) 말로 다 할 수 없는, 실로 엄청난[막대한] [본문으로]
2. main reason 의 반복을 피하기 위해 사용한 표현으로 보임 [본문으로]
3. foster economic growth ; 경제성장을 촉진하다 정도의 뉘앙스 [본문으로]
4. retard ; (격식) (발전・진전을) 지연[지체]시키다 [본문으로]
5. predation ; [명사] (전문 용어) (동물의) 포식 [본문으로]
6. warlord ; (못마땅함) (반군 등 비정규군의) 군 지도자 [본문으로]
7. fight over ; …에 관하여 싸우다 [본문으로]
8. stir up ; (강한 감정을) 불러일으키다 [본문으로]
9. tribal ; [주로 명사 앞에 씀] 부족의, 종족의 [본문으로]
10. animosity ; pl. -ies ~ (toward(s) sb/sth) | ~ (between A and B) 반감, 적대감 [본문으로]
11. militiaman ; pl. -men / -mən / 민병대[의용군]의 일원 [본문으로]
12. subsist ; ~ (on sth) 근근이 살아가다[먹고 살다] [본문으로]
13. hurdle ; 3. 장애, 난관 [본문으로]
14. pull out ; ~을 (~에서) 떼어 내다[철수시키다] [본문으로]
15. fight to ; ~가 될때까지 싸우다 [본문으로]
16. stalemate ; 2. [U , sing.] (체스에서) 수가 막힘(그래서 승자 없이 게임이 끝나게 되는 상태) [본문으로]
17. withdraw ; 앞의 pull out 과 같이 가는 표현 [본문으로]
18. remaining ; 남아있는, 잔여의 [본문으로]
19. take over ; 점거하다, 차지하다, 인수하다, 인계받다 [본문으로]
20. in power ; 권력의 자리에 있는, 정권을 쥐고 있는. [본문으로]
21. stakes are high ; 리스크가 크다, 위험성이 높다 [본문으로]
22. air support ; (지상군・해상군에 대한) 공중 지원 [본문으로]
23. ramp pressure on ; ~에 대해 압력을 가하다 ;; ramp up ; ~을 늘리다[증가시키다] [본문으로]
24. rear base ; 후방 기지 [본문으로]
25. war-scorched ; 흐름상 전쟁의 피해를 입은, 정도의 의미 // scorch ; 1. (불에) 그슬리다[눋게 하다] [본문으로]
26. peacekeeper ; 1. 평화 유지군(의 한 사람) [본문으로]
27. breathing-space ; 숨 돌릴 틈[시간] [본문으로]
28. start afresh ; 다시 시작하다 [본문으로]
29. drive back ; 1. …을 물리치다; [차]를 후진시키다 [본문으로]
30. insurgent ; 주로 복수로) (격식) 반란[내란]을 일으킨 사람 [본문으로]
31. historic ; 역사적으로 중요한, 역사에 남을 만한, 역사적인 [본문으로]
32. be imposed from outside ; 외부에 의해 강압되다 [본문으로]
33. stiff resistance ; 완강한[심한] 저항 [본문으로]
34. militia ; 민병대, 의용군 [본문으로]
35. budget-burgling ; 예산을 훔쳐가는, 등쳐먹는 [본문으로]
36. physical security ; 물리적 보안 [본문으로]
37. entrench ; [타동사][VN] [주로 수동태로] (때로 못마땅함) (변경이 어렵도록) 단단히 자리 잡게 하다 [본문으로]
38. grow rich ; 부를 이루다[쌓다] [본문으로]
39. poppy ; pl. -ies 양귀비 [본문으로]
40. become capable ; 유능하게 되다, 능력을 갖추다 [본문으로]
41. tax collection ; 세금 징수 [본문으로]
42. drawdown ; [미] 삭감, 축소; 수위의 저하; 론(loan)의 차용 총액; (대용량의 전력 소비 기구(器具)의 접속에 의한) 일시적 전압 강하 [본문으로]
43. be curbed ; 제약, 제한을 받다. [본문으로]
44. side issue ; 부차적인[지엽적인] 문제 [본문으로]
45. predatory ; 2. (사람이) 포식 동물 같은, 약한 사람들을 이용해 먹는 [본문으로]
46. be terrified of ; ~를 두려워, 무서워하다 [본문으로]
47. implement reform ; 개혁, 개편을 실시하다 [본문으로]
48. pour in money ; 돈을 쏟아 붓다. [본문으로]
49. pull back ; 후퇴하다[물러나다] [본문으로]
50. parachute in ; to put somebody from outside an organization into a senior position in the organization ; 낙하산으로 입사하다 [본문으로]
51. poach ; 훔치다, 빼앗다, 침범하다 [본문으로]
52. parallel state ; 평행한, 유사한 상태 [본문으로]
53. pack up ; (떠나기 위해) (짐을) 싸다[챙기다] ; 작동을 멈추다[서다] [본문으로]
54. scale up ; (크기·규모를) 확대하다[늘리다] [본문으로]
55. largesse ; [U] (격식 또는 유머) (돈에 대해) 후함; 후한 행위; 부조금[기부금] [본문으로]
56. be channeled through ; ~을 통해 지급, 제공, 옳겨지다 [본문으로]
57. coffer ; 2. [pl.] (cof・fers) (정부・단체 등의) 재원[금고] [본문으로]
58. stick around ; (어떤 곳에(서)) 가지 않고 있다[머무르다] [본문으로]
59. long run ; 장기간 [본문으로]
60. neither of ; …의 어느 쪽도 아니다. [본문으로]
61. neither of ~ 를 단수로 받음 확인 [본문으로]
62. nation-building ; 국가건설 [본문으로]