[Annotated] Is China challenging the United States for global leadership?

Xi Jinping talks of a "China solution", without specifying^[각주:1] what that means 

As Donald Trump prepares to welcome Xi Jinping next week for the two men's first face-to-face encounter, both countries are reassessing^[각주:2] their place in the world. They are looking in opposite directions: America away from shouldering^[각주:3] global responsibilities, China towards it. And they are reappraising^[각주:4] their positions in very different ways. Hare-like^[각주:5], the Trump administration is dashing from^[각주:6] one policy to the next, sometimes contradicting itself^[각주:7] and willing to box^[각주:8] any rival it sees. China, tortoise-like^[각주:9], is extending its head cautiously beyond^[각주:10] its carapace^[각주:11], taking slow, painstaking^[각주:12] steps. Aesop knew how this contest is likely to end. 

China's guiding foreign-policy^[각주:13] principle used to be Deng Xiaoping's admonition^[각주:14] in 1992 that the country should "keep a low profile^[각주:15], never take the lead... and make a difference." This shifted^[각주:16] a little in 2010 when officials started to say China should make a difference "actively". It shifted further in January when Mr Xi went to the World Economic Forum^[각주:17] in Davos, Switzerland, and told the assembled^[각주:18] throng^[각주:19] that China should "guide economic globalization". Diplomats in Beijing swap rumors^[각주:20] that a first draft of^[각주:21] Mr Xi's speech focused on the domestic economy^[각주:22], an uncontroversial^[각주:23] subject that Chinese leaders usually like to talk about abroad. Mr Xi is said to have rejected this version, and brought in^[각주:24] foreign consultants to write one dwelling more on^[각주:25] China's view of the world. Whether this story is true or not, the speech was strikingly^[각주:26] international in tone and and subject matter^[각주:27]. 

A day later Mr Xi made it clear whom he had in his sights. At the UN in Geneva, he talked about a "hegemon^[각주:28] imposing its will on others^[각주:29]" and warned America about a "Thucydides trap^[각주:30]" - the disaster that befell^[각주:31] ancient Greece when the incumbent power, Sparta, failed to accommodate^[각주:32] the rising one, Athens. In February Mr Xi told a conference on security^[각주:33] in Beijin that China should "guide international society" towards a "more just and rational new world order". Previously Mr Xi had ventured^[각주:34] only that China should play a role in building such a world.

Your consensus^[각주:35] is nonsense

There was a time when America was urging China to^[각주:36] step up^[각주:37] its global game. In 2005 Robert Zoellick, then America's deputy secretary of state^[각주:38], urged China to become a "responsible stakeholder^[각주:39]" in the international system. But nothing much happened. After the financial crisis of 2008 there was excited talk^[각주:40] in China and the West about a "China model" or Beijing consensus". This was supposedly^[각주:41] an alternative to the so-called^[각주:42] Washington consensus, a prescription of^[각주:43] free-market economic policies for developing countries. But those who promoted a China model did not say that it should be adopted by^[각주:44] other countries, only that it was right to reject what they saw as a one-size-fits-all^[각주:45] Washington consensus. Is there more to it this time? Is China challenging America for global leadership?

To answer that, it is important to begin with^[각주:46] the way China's political system works. Policies rarely emerge fully formed in^[각주:47] a presidential speech^[각주:48]. Officials often prefer to send subtle^[각주:49] signals about intended^[각주:50] changes, in a way that^[각주:51] gives the government room^[각주:52] to retreat^[각주:53] should the new approach fail. The signals are amplified by^[각주:54] similar ones further down the system and fleshed out by^[각주:55] controlled discussions in state-owned media. In the realm of^[각주:56] foreign policy, all that is happening now.

Soon after Mr Xi's comments in Davos and Beijing, the prime minister, Li Keqiang, gave his annual "work report" - a sort of state-of-the-nation speech. It included an unusually long passage about foreign policy and mentioned quanqiu (meaning global) or quanqiuhua (globalization) 13 times. That compares with only five such mentions last year.

As is^[각주:57] their wont, state-run media have distilled the new thinking into^[각주:58] numerical^[각주:59] mnemonics^[각주:60]. They refer enthusiastically^[각주:61] to Mr Xi's remarks on^[각주:62] globalization and a new world order^[각주:63] as the "two guides". And they have begun to discuss the makings of^[각주:64] an idea that, unlike the old one of a China model, the country would like to sell to others. This is the so-called "China solution". The phrase was first mentioned last July, on the 95th anniversary^[각주:65] of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party. Mr Xi's celebratory^[각주:66] speech asserted^[각주:67] that the Chinese people were "fully confident that they can provide a China solution to humanity's search for better social institutions^[각주:68]". The term has gone viral^[각주:69]. Baidu, China's most popular search engine, counts 22m usages of its Chinese rendering^[각주:70]: Zhongguo fang'an.

No one has defined what the China solution is. But, whatever it means, there is one for everything. Strengthening global government? There is a China solution to that, said the People's Daily, the party's main mouthpiece^[각주:71], in mid-March. Climate change? "The next step is for us to bring China's own solution," said Xie Zhenhua, the government's special climate envoy, in another newspaper, Southern Metropolis. There is even a China solution to the problem of bolstering the rule of law, claimed an article in January in Study Times, a weekly for officials. Multi-billion-dollar investments in infrastructure in Central Asia are China's solution to poverty and instability^[각주:72] there. And so on. Unlike the China model, which its boosters^[각주:73] said was aimed at developing countries, the China solution, says David Kelly of China Policy, a consultancy, is for everyone - including Western countries.

This marks a change^[각주:74]. Chinese leaders never praised the China model; its fans were mainly Chinese academics and the country's cheerleaders^[각주:75] in the West. (Long before the term became fashionable^[각주:76], Deng advised the president of Ghana: "Do not follow the China model.") Most officials were wary of^[각주:77] it because the term could be interpreted as China laying down the law to^[각주:78] others, contradicting its policy of not interfering in^[각주:79] other countries' internal affairs^[각주:80]. In contrast, it was Mr Xi himself who broached^[각주:81] the idea of the China solution. His prime minister included it in his work report^[각주:82]. China now seems more relaxed about bossing others around^[각주:83].

This reflects^[각주:84] not only the determination of the leadership to play a bigger role, but a growing confidence that China can do it. China's self-assurance^[각주:85] has been bolstered by what it sees as recent foreign-policy successes. Last year an international tribunal^[각주:86] ruled against^[각주:87] China's claims to sovereignty^[각주:88] in much of the South China Sea. But China promptly^[각주:89] persuaded the Philippines, which had brought the case, implicitly^[각주:90] to disavow^[각주:91] its legal victory, eschew^[각주:92] its once-close ties with^[각주:93] America and sign a deal^[각주:94] accepting vast quantities of Chinese investment. Soon after that Malaysia, another hitherto^[각주:95] America-leaning country with maritime claims overlapping^[각주:96] those of China, came to a similar arrangement. China's leaders concluded that, despite the tribunal's^[각주:97] ruling^[각주:98], 2016 had been a good year for them in the South China Sea. 

It was certainly a notable^[각주:99] one for Mr Xi's most ambitious foreign policy, called the "Belt and Road Initiative^[각주:100]". The scheme^[각주:101] involves infrastructure investment along the old Silk Road between China and Europe. The value of contracts signed under the scheme came within^[각주:102] a whisker of $1trn^[각주:103] last year - not bad for something that only started in 2013. Chinese exports to^[각주:104] the 60-odd Belt and Road countries overtook^[각주:105] those to America and the European Union. In May Mr Xi is due to^[각주:106] convene^[각주:107] a grand summit of the countries to celebrate and advertise a project that could one day rival^[각주:108] transatlantic trade^[각주:109] in importance^[각주:110].

But talk of^[각주:111] "guiding globalization" and a "China solution" does not mean China is turning its back on^[각주:112] the existing global order or challenging American leadership of it across the board. China is a revisionist^[각주:113] power, wanting to expand influence^[각주:114] within the system. It is neither a revolutionary power bent on^[각주:115] overthrowing^[각주:116] things, nor a usurper^[각주:117], intent^[각주:118] grabbing global control.

China is the third-largest donor to the UN's budget after America and Japan and is the second-largest contributor^[각주:119], after America, to the UN's peacekeeping. Last year China chaired^[각주:120] a summit of the Group of 20 largest economies - it has an above-average^[각주:121] record of complying with^[각주:122] the G20's decisions. Recently it has stepped up^[각주:123] its multilateral^[각주:124] commitments. In 2015 it secured^[각주:125] the adoption of^[각주:126] the yuan as one of the IMF's five reserve currencies^[각주:127]. It has set up^[각주:128] two financial institutions, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the New Development Bank, which are modeled on^[각주:129] traditional ones such as the World Bank. Global rules on trade and finance, it seems, are too important for Mr Xi not to defend.

China is becoming a more active participant in the UN, but it is not trying to dominate it. It reacts to, rather than initiates^[각주:130], sanctions^[각주:131] policy towards North Korea. And despite its own extensive^[각주:132] anti-terrorist operations^[각주:133] at home, it shows little interest in joining, let alone leading, operations against Islamic State.

There are domestic constraints^[각주:134] on Mr Xi's ambitions. China's vast bureaucracy is resistant to^[각주:135] change in foreign policy, as in everything else. During a recent trip to Australia the foreign minister^[각주:136], Wang Yi, said China had "no intention of leading anybody". He was not contradicting^[각주:137] Mr Xi, but neither was he echoing^[각주:138] the president's desire to guide a new world order. Ding Yifang of the Institute of World Development, a think-tank in Beijing, is similarly cautious about the China solution. "We don't have universal ideals," he says. "We are not that ambitious."

Globalism with Chinese characteristics 

So what might China's unassuming^[각주:139] new assertiveness^[각주:140] mean in practice^[각주:141]? A template^[각주:142] can be found in climate-change policy. China was one of the main obstacles to global climate agreement in 2008, but now its words are the lingua franca of^[각주:143] climate-related diplomacy. Parts of a deal on carbon emissions between Mr Xi and Barack Obama were incorporated wholesale into^[각주:144] the Paris climate treaty^[각주:145] of 2016. China helped determine how that accord^[각주:146] defines what are known as "common and differentiated^[각주:147] responsibilities", namely^[각주:148] how much each country should be responsible for cutting emissions.

As chairman of the G20 last year, Mr Xi made the fight against climate change a priority for the group. But China's clout^[각주:149] at that time was bolstered by^[각주:150] its accord with America. Now Mr Trump is beginning to dismantle^[각주:151] his predecessor's climate policies. Li Shou of Greenpeace says China is therefore preparing to go it along as Mr Xie, the climate envoy, said in January that it was prepared to do. It may be that a "China solution" to climate change will be the first practical application^[각주:152] of the term.

Soon after Mr Xi's speech in Davos, Zhang Jun, a senior Foreign Ministry official, put his finger on^[각주:153] China's changing place in the world. "I would say it is not China rushing to the front," he told a newspaper in Hong Kong, "but rather the front-runners^[각주:154] have stepped back^[각주:155], leaving the place to China." But officials have far fewer qualms^[각주:156] than Deng did about being at the front. "If China is required to play a leadership role," says Mr Zhang, "it will assume its responsibilities^[각주:157]."

1. specify ; (speci・fies , speci・fy・ing , speci・fied , speci・fied) (구체적으로) 명시하다 [본문으로]
2. reassess ; [타동사][VN] 재평가하다 [본문으로]
3. shoulder ; 1. ACCEPT RESPONSIBILITY | [타동사][VN] (책임을) 짊어지다[떠맡다/받아들이다] [본문으로]
4. reappraise ; [타동사][VN] (격식) 재평가[검토]하다 [본문으로]
5. harelike ; [형용사] 산토끼 같은; 겁쟁이 같은. [본문으로]
6. dash from ; ~에서 달려 나오다 [본문으로]
7. contradict ; 1. (어떤 사람의 말을) 부정[부인]하다, 반박하다 [본문으로]
8. box ; 1. FIGHT | [자,타동사][V, VN] (…와) 권투를 하다 [본문으로]
9. tortoise-like ; Resembling or characteristic of a tortoise; thus frequently slow or unhurried ;; tortoise ; [명사] 거북 참고 terrapin, turtle ;; US [|tɔ:rtəs] / UK [|tɔ:təs] [본문으로]
10. extend ; 1. MAKE LONGER/LARGER/WIDER | [타동사][VN] 더 길게[크게/넓게] 만들다 [본문으로]
11. carapace ; [명사] (전문 용어) (새우・게 등의) 껍질[갑각] [본문으로]
12. painstaking ; [형용사] (주로 명사 앞에 씀) 공들인 [본문으로]
13. foreign policy ; 외교 정책[방침] [본문으로]
14. admonition ; [C , U] (또한 드물게 ad・mon・ish・ment / əd|mɑ:nɪʃmənt ; 美 -|mɑːn- /) (격식) 책망, 경고 [본문으로]
15. keep a low profile ; 세간의 이목을 피하다, 겸손함을 유지하다, 저자세를 취하다; 두드러지지 않다 [본문으로]
16. shift ; 4. SITUATION/OPINION/POLICY | [타동사][VN] ~ sth (from…) (to/towards/toward…) (견해・태도・방식을) 바꾸다 [본문으로]
17. the World Economic Forum ; [명사] 세계 경제포럼(스위스의 Davos에서 열림). [본문으로]
18. assembled ; [형용사] 모인, 집합된, 결집한 [본문으로]
19. throng ; [명사] (문예체) 인파, 군중 [본문으로]
20. swap ; 1. ~ (sth) (with sb) | ~ sth for sth (어떤 것을 주고 그 대신 다른 것으로) 바꾸다, (이야기 등을) 나누다 [본문으로]
21. draft ; 1. [C] (아직 완성본이 아닌) 원고, 초안 [본문으로]
22. domestic economy ; 가정경제, 국내경제 [본문으로]
23. uncontroversial ; [형용사] 논란의 여지가 없는[적은] ;; 참고 non-controversial [본문으로]
24. bring in ; 들여오다; <이익·이자를> 가져오다; <새로운 것을> 받아들이다, 수입하다; <의제 등을> 제출하다; <협력자 등의> 참가를 의뢰하다; <배심원이> <평결(評決)을> 답신(答申)하다; 야구 생환시키다; 경찰에 연행하다 [본문으로]
25. dwell on ; …을 깊이 생각하다, 숙고하다, ~을 곱씹다[되씹다] [본문으로]
26. strikingly ; [부사] 두드러지게, 눈에 띄게 [본문으로]
27. subject matter ; [명사] (책・연설・그림 등의) 주제[소재] [본문으로]
28. hegemon ; [명사] 주도권[헤게모니]을 장악하고 있는 사람[국가], 패권국 ;; US [hédƷəmɑ̀n] / UK [-mɔ́n] [본문으로]
29. impose one's will on ; (…에 대한) 자신의 뜻을 강요하다. [본문으로]
30. Thucydides trap ; Allison, an American political scientist and professor, coined the phrase "Thucydides Trap" to refer to when a rising power causes fear in an established power which escalates toward war. Thucydides wrote: "What made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta ;; [본문으로]
31. befall ; [타동사][VN] (be・fell / bI'fel / , be・fallen / bI'fOːlən /) [3인칭에 대해서만 쓰임] (문예체) (안 좋은 일이) 닥치다 [본문으로]
32. accommodate ; 5. ~ to sth | ~ sth/yourself to sth (격식) (환경 등에) 맞추다 [본문으로]
33. conference on security ; 안전 보장 회의 [본문으로]
34. venture ; 2. (격식) (모험하듯) 조심스럽게 말하다[하다] [본문으로]
35. consensus ; [sing., U] ~ (among sb) | ~ (about sth) | ~ (that…) 의견 일치, 합의 [본문으로]
36. urge ; 1. (…하도록) 충고하다[설득하려 하다] [본문으로]
37. step up ; 앞으로 나오다[나가다] [본문으로]
38. deputy secretary of state ; 국무부 부장관 [본문으로]
39. stakeholder ; 1. 이해 당사자, 주주 [본문으로]
40. talk ; 5. STORIES/RUMOURS | [U] ~ (of sth/of doing sth) | ~ (that…) (장차 어떤 일이 있을지도 모른다는) 소문[이야기] [본문으로]
41. supposedly ; [부사] 추정상, 아마 [본문으로]
42. so-called ; [형용사] (명사 앞에만 씀) 소위, 이른바 [본문으로]
43. prescription ; 4. [C] ~ (for sth) (격식) (비유적으로) 처방[방안] [본문으로]
44. adopt ; 4. NEW NAME/COUNTRY | [타동사][VN] (이름・국가・제도 등을) 택하다[차용하다] [본문으로]
45. one-size-fits-all ; [형용사] (명사 앞에만 씀) 널리[두루] 적용되도록 만든 [본문으로]
46. begin with ; …으로 시작하다. [본문으로]
47. be formed in ; ~에서 생기다 [본문으로]
48. presidential speech [address] ; 대통령 연설 [본문으로]
49. subtle ; 2. (사람・행동이) 교묘한, 영리한 [본문으로]
50. intended ; [명사 앞에만 씀], (참고: unintended) 1. (성취・도달) 대상[목표]으로 삼은, 의도[겨냥]하는 [본문으로]
51. in a way that ; ~한 방법으로 [본문으로]
52. room ; 6. POSSIBILITY | [U] ~ for sth 여지 [본문으로]
53. retreat ; 3. CHANGE DECISION | [자동사][V + adv. / prep.] (하려던 일에서) 물러서다 [본문으로]
54. amplify ; 1. [타동사][VN] 증폭시키다 [본문으로]
55. flesh out ; ~에 살을 붙이다[~을 더 구체화하다], to give substance to (an argument, description, etc) [본문으로]
56. in the realm of ; ~의 영역에서 [본문으로]
57. as is ; (어떤 조건·상태이건) 있는 그대로 [본문으로]
58. distill ; 2. 증류하여 <불순물을> 제거하다 ((off, out)) [본문으로]
59. numerical ; [형용사] (또한 드물게 nu・mer・ic / -ɪk /) 수의, 수와 관련된, 숫자로 나타낸 [본문으로]
60. mnemonic ; [명사] (기억을 돕는) 연상 기호 ;; US [nɪ|mɑ:nɪk] / UK [nɪ|mɒnɪk] [본문으로]
61. enthusiastically ; [부사] 열광적으로(ardently), 열중하여, 매우 열심히 [본문으로]
62. remark ; 1. [C] (말이나 글로 의견・생각 등을 표하는) 발언[말/논평/언급] [본문으로]
63. world order ; (정치학) <용어>세계질서 [본문으로]
64. making ; [U] [흔히 합성어에 쓰여] ~ (of sth) 만들기, 제작, 생산 ;; 참고 haymaking, non-profit [본문으로]
65. anniversary ; [명사] pl. -ies 기념일 [본문으로]
66. celebratory ; [형용사] 기념[축하]하는 [본문으로]
67. assert ; 1. (사실임을 강하게) 주장하다 [본문으로]
68. social institution ; (사회복지학) 사회제도 [본문으로]
69. go viral ; 입소문이 나다 [본문으로]
70. rendering ; 2. [C] 번역 [본문으로]
71. mouthpiece ; 3. ~ (of/for sb) 대변자(그런 역할을 하는 사람・신문 등) [본문으로]
72. instability ; (pl. -ies), [U , C], [주로 복수로], (참고: unstable) 1. 불안정 [본문으로]
73. booster ; 5. (특히 美) (특히 정치적) 후원자 [본문으로]
74. mark a change ; 변화를 보이다, 변화에 주목하다 [본문으로]
75. cheerleader ; 2. (특정 정치가・사상 등의) 지지자 [본문으로]
76. fashionable ; 1. 유행하는, 유행을 따른 [본문으로]
77. be wary of ; …을 조심하는. [본문으로]
78. lay down the law ; 강압적으로 말하다 [본문으로]
79. interfere in ; 개입하다, 간섭하다, 방해하다 [본문으로]
80. internal affairs ; [명사] 국내[내부] 문제, 내무(內務). [본문으로]
81. broach ; [타동사][VN] ~ (sth) (to/with sb) (하기 힘든 이야기를) 꺼내다 [본문으로]
82. work report ; 작업보고서 [본문으로]
83. boss (sb) around ; ~에게 이래라저래라 지시하다 ; to tell somebody what to do in a determined or unpleasant way [본문으로]
84. reflect ; 3. [타동사][VN] (사물의 속성・사람의 태도・감정을) 나타내다[반영하다] [본문으로]
85. self-assurance ; [명사] [U] 자신(自信); 자기 과신 [본문으로]
86. international tribunal ; (정치학) <기구/단체>국제재판소 [본문으로]
87. rule against ; …에게 불리한 재결을 하다 [본문으로]
88. claim to sovereignty ; 영유권을 주장하다 [본문으로]
89. promptly ; 3. [항상 동사 앞에 쓰여] 즉시 [본문으로]
90. implicitly ; [부사] 암암리에, 함축적으로; 무조건[절대적]으로; 내재하여 [본문으로]
91. disavow ; [타동사][VN] (격식) (무엇에 대한 지식・책임을 공개적으로) 부인하다 [본문으로]
92. eschew ; [타동사][VN] (격식) 피하다, 삼가다 ;; US.UK [ɪs|tʃu:] [본문으로]
93. tie ; 3. CONNECTION | [주로 복수로] (강한) 유대[관계] [본문으로]
94. sign a deal with ; ~와 계약을 맺다 [본문으로]
95. hitherto ; [부사] (격식) 지금까지; 그때까지 ;; US [|hɪðər|tu:] / UK [|hɪðə|tu:] [본문으로]
96. overlap ; 4. ~ (with sth) (관심・지식・책임 등이 일부) 공통되다[중복되다] [본문으로]
97. tribunal ; [C+sing./pl. v.] (특별한 문제를 다루는) 재판소, 법원, 조사[심사] 위원회 ;; 참고 industrial tribunal [본문으로]
98. ruling ; [명사] ~ (on sth) (특히 판사의) 결정, 판결 [본문으로]
99. notable ; [형용사] ~ (for sth) 주목할 만한, 눈에 띄는; 중요한, 유명한 [본문으로]
100. initiative ; 1. [C] (특정한 문제 해결・목적 달성을 위한 새로운) 계획 [본문으로]
101. scheme ; [~ (for doing sth) | ~ (to do sth)] 1. (英) (운영) 계획, 제도 ;; 참고 colour scheme, pension scheme [본문으로]
102. come within ; [책임·일 따위]의 범위 안에 있다[든다] [본문으로]
103. come[be] within a whisker of ; 거의 …할 뻔하다 [본문으로]
104. export to ; …로 수출하다. [본문으로]
105. overtake ; 2. [타동사][VN] (수・양・중요도 면에서) 앞지르다[능가/추월하다] [본문으로]
106. be due to ; ~할 예정이다 [본문으로]
107. convene ; (격식) 1. [타동사][VN] (회의 등을) 소집하다 [본문으로]
108. rival ; [타동사][VN] (-ll- , 美 또한 -l-) ~ sb/sth (for/in sth) (…에) 필적하다[비할 만하다] ;; 참고 unrivalled [본문으로]
109. transatlantic trade ; 대서양 횡단 무역 [본문으로]
110. in importance ; 중요도에 관한 부분에서 [본문으로]
111. talk of ; ~에 관한 이야기 [본문으로]
112. turn one's back on ; [동사] 저버리다, 무시하다; …으로부터 도망치다. ;; 동의어 forsake, neglect. [본문으로]
113. revisionist ; [명사] 수정론자 [본문으로]
114. expand influence ; 세력을 확장하다 [본문으로]
115. bent on ; [형용사] (보통 안 좋은 일에) 작정을 하고 덤비는, 열중하고 있는; 결심하고 있는. ;; 동의어 determined; resolved. [본문으로]
116. overthrow ; [타동사][VN] (over・threw / -'Truː / over・thrown / -'TrəUn ; 美 -'TroUn /) (지도자・정부를) 타도하다[전복시키다] [본문으로]
117. usurper ; [명사] (권력· 지위의) 강탈자, 횡령[점유]자. [본문으로]
118. intent ; [U] ~ (to do sth) (격식 또는 법률) 의도 [본문으로]
119. contributor ; 2. 기부[기여]자 [본문으로]
120. chair ; [타동사][VN] 의장을 맡다 [본문으로]
121. above-average ; [형용사] 평균 이상의; 보통이 아닌 [본문으로]
122. comply with ; 순응하다, 지키다, 준수하다 [본문으로]
123. step up ; 앞으로 나오다[나가다] [본문으로]
124. multilateral ; (참고: bilateral , trilateral , unilateral) 1. 다자간[다국간]의 [본문으로]
125. secure ; 1. GET STH | ~ sth (for sb/sth) | ~ sb sth (격식) (특히 힘들게) 얻어 내다, 획득[확보]하다 [본문으로]
126. adoption ; 2. [U] (아이디어・계획 등의) 채택 [본문으로]
127. reserve currency ; (금융) 준비 통화 [본문으로]
128. set up ; [동사] 건립하다, 설립[수립]하다; 준비하다; …인 체하다; 함정에 빠뜨리다. ;; 동의어 erect, establish; prepare; claim to be; entrap, frame. [본문으로]
129. model (sth) on[after] (sth) ; ~을 본떠서 ~을 만들다;; be modeled on[after] ; ~을 본떠서 만들어지다 [본문으로]
130. initiate ; 1. (격식) 개시되게 하다, 착수시키다 [본문으로]
131. sanction ; 1. [C] [주로 복수로] ~ (against sb) 제재 [본문으로]
132. extensive ; 1. 아주 넓은[많은], 대규모의 [본문으로]
133. operation ; 2. ORGANIZED ACTIVITY | [C] (조직적인) 작전[활동] [본문으로]
134. constraint ; 1. [C] ~ (on sth) 제약(이 되는 것) [본문으로]
135. resistant to ; …에 대해 저항하는. [본문으로]
136. foreign minister ; (특히 영) [보통 F- M-] 외무부 장관(foreign secretary) [본문으로]
137. contradict ; 1. (어떤 사람의 말을) 부정[부인]하다, 반박하다 [본문으로]
138. echo ; 3. [타동사][VN] (사상・의견에) 공명하다[반향을 보이다] [본문으로]
139. unassuming ; [형용사] (호감) 잘난 체하지 않는 [본문으로]
140. assertiveness ; [명사] 자기 주장 [본문으로]
141. in practice ; 실제는, 실제로, 실행상 [본문으로]
142. template ; 2. 견본, 본보기 [본문으로]
143. lingua franca ; [명사] (주로 단수로) (언어) 국제어, 공통어 ;; [|lɪŋgwə|frӕŋkə] [본문으로]
144. incorporate ; 1. ~ sth (in/into/within sth) (일부로) 포함하다 [본문으로]
145. treaty ; [명사] pl. -ies 조약 [본문으로]
146. accord ; [명사] (기관・국가 간의 공식적인) 합의 [본문으로]
147. differentiated ; 차별화된 [본문으로]
148. namely ; [부사] 즉, 다시 말해 [본문으로]
149. clout ; 1. [U] 영향력 [본문으로]
150. bolster ; [타동사][VN] ~ sth (up) 북돋우다, 강화[개선]하다 [본문으로]
151. dismantle ; 2. (조직・체제를) 해체하다 [본문으로]
152. practical application ; 응용, 실질적인 적용, 실제 적용 [본문으로]
153. put / lay one's finger on ; …을 확실히[분명히] 지적하다 [본문으로]
154. front-runner ; [명사] 선두주자(말), 선구자 [본문으로]
155. step back ; (~에서) 한 걸음 물러나 생각하다 [본문으로]
156. qualm ; [명사] (주로 복수로) ~ (about sth) 거리낌, 꺼림칙함 ;; [kwɑ:m;kwɔ:m] [본문으로]
157. assume / shoulder a responsibility ; 책임을 짊어지다 [본문으로]