[Annotated] A new generation is rising in Russia

Vladimir Putin's election victory does not mean that there is no hope

Konstantin Chernenko, the general secretary of^[각주:1] the Communist Party, died on the night of March 10th 1985 at the age of 73. As red flags trimmed with black ribbons^[각주:2] went up in every city in the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev rushed to an emergency meeting of the Politburo in the Kremlin. That meeting put Mr Gorbachev in charge of the funeral committee - and thus, by extension^[각주:3], of the Communist Party and the country. Chernenko was of the generation that had risen through the ranks under^[각주:4] Stalin. (And he was the third general secretary to die in less than three years, in what was memorably dubbed^[각주:5] a "hearse race^[각주:6]".) After him, the party elders all felt that a younger, more dynamic leader was needed to rejuvenate the Soviet system^[각주:7] and ensure its survival. 

It was not until four the next morning that Mr Gorbachev returned to his dacha^[각주:8]. As he and his wife walked the snow-covered paths of^[각주:9] its garden, he summed up the mood of^[각주:10] the elite and the country: "We just can't go on living like this." Nor did they. Mr Gorbachev gave individual livelihoods and well-being - the "human values", as he put it - precedence over state or class interests, launching new policies of glasnost^[각주:11] (openness) and perestroika^[각주:12] (restructuring), and bringing the cold war to a close. 

The Soviet system could not keep going without deception^[각주:13] and repression^[각주:14]. Unwittingly^[각주:15] and unwillingly^[각주:16], Mr Gorbachev brought about its end. What followed, however, was not the miraculous emergence of^[각주:17] a "normal" country as many had hoped, but a decade of turbulence^[각주:18], economic decline^[각주:19], rising crime and social breakdown^[각주:20], and Mr Gorbachev got the blame. As he said years later, "It is my grandchildren's generation who are benefiting from perestroika^[각주:21]. They are more confident, freer, they know that they must rely on themselves."

Alexander Gabuev was born on the day Cherneko died. He is one of those "grandchildren". Now 33, he is the chief China expert at the Moscow Carnegie Center, a think-tank. Fluent in English, Mandarin and German, he criss-crosses the world^[각주:22] briefing^[각주:23] government officials^[각주:24]. In his spare time, between playing tennis and drinking rum cocktails in a Moscow bar, he cultivates a network of^[각주:25] young experts and policymakers^[각주:26] to thrash out^[각주:27] "actionable ideas" of^[각주:28] how to reform the country when they come to power^[각주:29]. "We need to be ready," he says. 

Olga Mostinskaya and Fedor Ovchinnikov are a few years older than Mr Gabuev. Ms Mostinskaya, 36, is a politician born into a family of diplomats^[각주:30]. She spent ten years as an interpreter working directly for Vladimir Putin Russia's president, before resigning in 2014 "out of repugnance^[각주:31]". The war in Ukraine and the annexation of^[각주:32] Crimea were only the last straw^[각주:33], she says. Three years later she was elected to a local council in^[각주:34] Moscow on a pledge to^[각주:35] "empower^[각주:36], inform and engage" her voters. 

Mr Ovchinnkov, also 36, grew up in a family of journalists in Syktyvkar, near the Arctic Circle^[각주:37]. He was a teenager when Mr Gorbachev, trying to raise money for his foundation, appeared in^[각주:38] a Pizza Hut commercial^[각주:39] with his ten-year-old granddaughter: "Because of him, we have opportunity!" a young man in the advert^[각주:40] tells a disgruntled^[각주:41] old-timer^[각주:42]. A decade later, Mr Ovchinnikov used that opportunity to launch a pizza place in Syktyvkar. His firm, Dodo, now has 300 outlets in Russia, as well as one in Britain and two in America. 

Regeneration^[각주:43] 

Belonging to a generation involves more than proximity of dates of birth^[각주:44]. As Karl Mannheim, a German sociologist, wrote in 1928, a meaningful generation is also forged by^[각주:45] the common experience of a trauma that becomes central to its identity. Contemporaries become^[각주:46] a generation, he argued, only when "they are potentially capable of being sucked into^[각주:47] the vortex of^[각주:48] social change^[각주:49]." 

Mr Gabuev, Ms Mostinskaya, Mr Ovchinnikov and other Russians are part of a new generation of Russian elite who share^[각주:50] the European values declared by Mr Gorbachev around the time of their birth and are traumatized by^[각주:51] their reversal 30 years later^[각주:52]. A significant and vocal group^[각주:53], they are imbued with a sense of^[각주:54] entitlement^[각주:55] and have the potential and desire to complete Russia's aborted^[각주:56] transition to^[각주:57] a "normal" country. Whether they get a chance to do so depends on many factors, including their determination and the resistance of^[각주:58] the system embodied by^[각주:59] Mr Putin's rule^[각주:60]. 

The new generation define themselves by their difference from their "fathers" as well as some similarities with their "grandfathers". Gorbachev's grandchildren recognize in each other a dissatisfaction with^[각주:61] the aggression^[각주:62], degradation and lies that underpin Mr Putin's rule^[각주:63]. He presides over^[각주:64] the sort of power structure that^[각주:65] Douglass North, an American political economist^[각주:66], has called the "natural state". In this, rents are created by limiting access to economic and political resources, and the limits are enforced by "specialists in violence". In Russia these are the siloviki of^[각주:67] the assorted security^[각주:68] and police forces^[각주:69], serving the system as they did in Soviet times. 

That system is not about to crumble^[각주:70]. But the rise of a new generation - especially one which, through quirks of^[각주:71] demography^[각주:72], is large - matters in Russia. "Every new group coming to power has always declared a break with the previous one," wrote Yuri Levada, a prominent Russian academic^[각주:73], "blaming it for every possible sin. A demonstrable rejection of^[각주:74] predecessors has been the main way for leaders of a new generation to establish themselves in power^[각주:75], regardless of whether they carried on^[각주:76] or changed the means and style of governance^[각주:77]."

Lacking strong civil institutions, Gorbachev's grandchildren look to their peers for definition, for their place in society and, as Mannheim would have it, in history. But so do their opponents, the disenfranchised nationalists^[각주:78] who are similarly dissatisfied with the corruption^[각주:79] and cynicism of^[각주:80] Mr Putin's rule. The difference, at least for now, is that the nationalists lack leadership and resources and are overshadowed by^[각주:81] the Kremlin's own rhetoric^[각주:82]. 

Only one winner

The presidential election on March 18th showed, on the face of it^[각주:83], little prospect of any change^[각주:84]. With television and the bureaucratic powers of^[각주:85] the state at his beck and call^[각주:86], Mr Putin was re-elected with 77% of the vote. The result reflected the status quo^[각주:87] and was hardly surprising. Many civil servants^[각주:88] and factory workers were cajoled into^[각주:89] voting by their bosses, and driven to the polls. Thanks to pre-election^[각주:90] thuggery^[각주:91], Mr Putin faced no serious challenger. Boris Nemtsov, the most credible liberal politician of^[각주:92] Mr Putin's generation, was murdered three years ago, shot beside the wall of the Kremlin. Alexei Navalny, the most plausible candidate of^[각주:93] the new generation, was barred from standing in^[각주:94] December after the Kremlin engineered^[각주:95] fraud charges against^[각주:96] him. 

"This is not an election," said Igor Malashenko, who helped Boris Yeltsin keep the presidency in 1996. "It is a theater performance directed by the Kremlin." But he still thought it mattered. That is why he ran the campaign of Ksenia Sobchak, a 36-year-old socialite-turned-politician. Her father was the first democratically elected mayor of St Petersburg and once Mr Putin's boss. She stood on the Kremlin's sufferance^[각주:97]. It used her as a spoiler for Mr Navalny, who is 41. But while the Kremlin used her, she hoped to use it to build a platform from which to move into real, as opposed to^[각주:98] Potemkin politics. For both Ms Sobchak and Mr Navalny an appeal to a young generation is central to their politics^[각주:99]. 

Ms Sobchack's's strategy was the opposite of Mr Navalny's. Once he had been barred from standing, he called for a boycott of the election to undermine^[각주:100] its legitimacy^[각주:101]. He accused Ms Sobchak of helping Mr Putin by taking part. Though blocked from standing, he managed to dominate the election agenda. Many young people are thought to have abstained^[각주:102], though it is hard to tell whether this was because of apathy^[각주:103] or a rejection of Mr Putin. 

As polling stations in^[각주:104] Moscow closed, Ms Sobchak, who in the end got only 1.7% of votes, went to Mr Navalny's headquarters blaming him for refusing to back her^[각주:105]. He pushed her away, nothing that her loss was a measure of his success. She looked deflated^[각주:106]; Mr Navalny, off camera, uncorked the champagne^[각주:107]. "We have created a new opposition in a place where it was impossible," he said. 

If the election was a ritual^[각주:108], it was still important. Giving Mr Putin another six years would "mark the arrival of the post-Putin era", argued Ivan Krastev and Gleb Pavlovsky, two political analysts, in a recent paper for the European Council on Foreign Relations^[각주:109], a think-tank. Constitutionally^[각주:110] Mr Putin cannot stand in 2024, and from now on political life will be dominated by the question of^[각주:111] succession^[각주:112] and expectation of his departure^[각주:113]. His own survival and preservation of the system he now presides over will be his sole^[각주:114] objective^[각주:115]. 

Mr Putin has seen crises of succession before - one brought him to power. As a young KGB officer he served the ossified leaderships of^[각주:116] Chernenko and Leonid Brezhnev. Their generation had grown old^[각주:117] in power in part because it had won it young. Stalin's purges^[각주:118] meant that by 1940 around half the party elite was under the age of 40. 

Who remembers the sixties?

The generation that followed identified themselves asshestidesiantniki - the men of the 1960s. Soviet victory in the second world war gave them confidence in their country. The 20th Congress of the Communist Party, at which Nikita Khrushchev denounced^[각주:119] Stalin, gave them their political inspiration. Many of their spiritual leaders were children of old Bolsheviks killed in the purges. They had a sense of being both entitled and required to put the country back on the course of true socialism - this time with a human face. Those hopes were crushed when Soviet tanks rolled into Prague^[각주:120] in 1968. They had to wait until 1985 for their chance. 

The Brezhnev generation stayed long in power; the men of the 1960s did not. Mr Gorbachev was gone by 1991. Yeltsin, his contemporary and successor, was not part of that generation ideologically^[각주:121] and surrounded himself with men who were 25-30 years his junior. The children of the 1960s men, the last Soviet generation, declared their fathers bankrupt both financially and intellectually^[각주:122]. Socialism with a human face died with the Soviet economy. 

The alternative^[각주:123] was capitalism, which Soviet propaganda had portrayed as^[각주:124] a cut-throat^[각주:125] and cynical system in which cunning^[각주:126] and ruthlessness^[각주:127] mattered more than integrity^[각주:128] or rules, and where money was the only measure of success^[각주:129]. The new elite did not abandon that view. Those with power and connections acquired^[각주:130] the material attributes of^[각주:131] Western life. They could not buy its institutions, rules or norms^[각주:132] - but they were not interested in trying. 

Meanwhile millions of people in the first post-revolutionary decade of^[각주:133] the 1990s felt disoriented^[각주:134], robbed of^[각주:135] social status^[각주:136] and savings^[각주:137]. This was cynically and successfully exploited by^[각주:138] Mr Putin. Yeltsin had prompted him as a man who^[각주:139], although of the next generation, would protect the wealth and safety of the elite. But Mr Putin consolidated his power^[각주:140] by rejecting Yeltsin's legacy^[각주:141] and demonizing the 1990s^[각주:142]. His first symbolic gesture was the restoration of^[각주:143] the Soviet anthem^[각주:144], which Yeltsin had abandoned. This was quickly followed by real changes, including suppression of^[각주:145] freedom of speech and redistribution of^[각주:146] assets^[각주:147] and rents^[각주:148]. 

Mr Putin has become the patron of^[각주:149] a cohort of^[각주:150] young technocrats^[각주:151] in order to manage, and survive, the next generational shift^[각주:152]. He wants these young men (as they are for the most part) to provide some economic modernization^[각주:153] while not upsetting the system^[각주:154] or provoking social unrest^[각주:155]. And he wants their continued deference^[각주:156] and loyalty as he moves from father figure to grandfather. Today six regional governors, two ministers and 20 deputy ministers^[각주:157] are in their 30s. Yet, politically Mr Putin needs these technocrats to preserve a system in which entitlements^[각주:158], privileges and rents are allocated not according to^[각주:159] law or merit^[각주:160] but by access to resources and by position in the social hierarchy. This system of "conditional^[각주:161]" property rights^[각주:162] has allowed Mr Putin's friends and cronies to^[각주:163] put their children into positions of wealth and power. 

The son of Nikolai Patrushev, the secretary of the National Security Council and former chief of theFSB, heads a state-owned bank^[각주:164]. The son of Sergei Ivanov, another former KGB officer and old friend of Mr Putin, is the head of Alrosa, a state-owned firm which mines more diamonds than any other in the world. The son of Mikhail Fradkov, a former prime minister and intelligence service chief^[각주:165], heads private bank which is the staple of^[각주:166] the military-industrial complex. Many children of Mr Putin's friends and cronies hold senior positions in Gazprom, Russia's gas monopoly, or own firms that depend on its contracts. All of them enjoy positions and wealth thanks largely to their family names. 

Yet this also makes them vulnerable to political changes that come with generational shifts^[각주:167]. Russian elites have endlessly tried to establish unconditional property rights for^[각주:168] themselves. Andrei Zorin, a historian at^[각주:169] Oxford University, sees this yearning for^[각주:170] institutions that can guarantee both physical security and the transfer of wealth across^[각주:171] the generations as one of the main reasons that Russian elites have sought to emulate Western Europe^[각주:172]. 

Those who oppose^[각주:173] 

For all the difference in their tactics^[각주:174], Mr Navalny and Ms Sobchak share a vision of^[각주:175] Russia as a normal European country subject to^[각주:176] the rule of law^[각주:177]. As a populist who comes from outside the system, Mr Navalny appeals to people alienated by^[각주:178] the elites. He demands retribution^[각주:179] and a complete^[각주:180] overhaul of government^[각주:181], with those now in power barred from office. Ms Sobchak, who is far closer to the beneficiaries of^[각주:182] Mr Putin's rule, promises a change without exposing the elite to reprisal^[각주:183]. Justifying this halfway house^[각주:184], she says "Everything in this country belongs to these people. Billions of dollars, the army and security services, the largest companies. They can lose it only if there is a social explosion and even then they will probably fight to the last bullet^[각주:185]. But Putin does not want to be a Qaddafi." 

This realism reflects the view that, even among the children of the elite, there is an appetite for change^[각주:186]. Dmitry Gudkov, a 37-year-old opposition politician whose^[각주:187] coalition^[각주:188] won a majority in more than a dozen local councils in Moscow, is also the son of a foremer KGB lieutenant-colonel^[각주:189], says: "The children [of the elite] are feeling uncomfortable in the shadow of their parents^[각주:190]. They don't want to be associated with^[각주:191] all this obscurantism^[각주:192], self-isolation and anti-Westernism. They don't want to risk their businesses now by speaking out in public, but they are constantly sending us signals that they are on our side." Mr Gudkov and Ms Sobchak are now forming a party together. 

The loyalists who^[각주:193] have come of age under^[각주:194] Mr Putin, and benefited from his patronage^[각주:195] - the cadre from which^[각주:196] he draws the technocrats whom^[각주:197] he hopes will shore up the system^[각주:198] - credit him with rebuilding the state^[각주:199]. But they, too, see change ahead. As Mr Pavlovsky puts it, they "want to make [the system] inhabitable^[각주:200]". But so did Mr Gorbachev when he came to power^[각주:201]. 

This interest in making or managing change, rather than simply benefiting from it, is relatively recent. In the 2000s Gorbachev's grandchildren seemed apolitical^[각주:202]. Soaring incomes^[각주:203], the opening of IKEA stores and a mushrooming of^[각주:204] cafés, bars and nightclubs in Moscow were not taken as an achievement of the state, for which they should be grateful^[각주:205], but as a norm which they took for granted^[각주:206]. They saw the end of the cold war not as a loss, but as part of becoming a normal country. 

Mr Putin (and his circle) had a complex relationship with the West, colored both by features of his generation and his service in the KGB. "As part of the last Soviet generation he longed for^[각주:207] Western comforts^[각주:208] and goods. As a KGB officer, he was he was instilled with an idea of^[각주:209] the West as an enemy," says Natalia Gevorkyan, Mr Putin's biographer^[각주:210]. The result was aressentiment mixture of jealousy and inferiority^[각주:211] which fueled anti-Americanism^[각주:212]. 

To Gorbachev's grandchildren, by contrast^[각주:213], the West was just a place where they went. They did not crave^[각주:214] its material^[각주:215] attributes^[각주:216] because they already had them. What they wanted were its institutions and rights. While older liberals lamented their lack of politics^[각주:217] and public life^[각주:218], they were cultivating their urban space^[각주:219], with its parks, bike lanes^[각주:220] and food courts. This shaped their expectations and sensibilities more than political statements. The presidency of Dmitry Medvedev, a place-holder^[각주:221] installed by^[각주:222] Mr Putin in 2008, fitted stylistically with^[각주:223] this urban modernization. 

The new generation had no great enthusiasm for^[각주:224] Mr Medvedev's politics, but they liked the fact that he loved his iPad (Mr Putin prides himself on^[각주:225] never using the internet^[각주:226]). As rumors of Mr Putin's return to the Kremlin began to swirl^[각주:227], though, Mr Medvedev started to become something more - a figurehead for^[각주:228] a modernization which he was not really enabling, but from which Mr Putin's return would be a step back. When in September 2011 Mr Medvedev announced a pre-arranged^[각주:229] job swap with^[각주:230] Mr Putin, who had sat out one presidential term as^[각주:231] prime minister, frustration boiled over^[각주:232]. 

Old style, new style

A rigged^[각주:233] parliamentary election in^[각주:234] 2011, which a few years earlier would have gone unnoticed^[각주:235], triggered protests in^[각주:236] Moscow and other big cities; hundreds of thousands of people took to the streets^[각주:237]. Mr Navalny galvanized the movement using^[각주:238] social networks. The young, including the previously apolitical elite, joined in. Ms Sobchak, once known only as an it-girl^[각주:239] and star of reality television^[각주:240], stood in front of a crowd and declared, "I am Ksenia Sobchak and I have much to lose." 

In anger^[각주:241], Mr Putin turned his back on the young^[각주:242] and the educated, appealing instead to older members of^[각주:243] the working class^[각주:244] and public-sector workers^[각주:245] and unleashing^[각주:246] nationalist and traditionalist rhetoric that^[각주:247] infringed on^[각주:248] the urban elite's style and private space. "It was my breaking point^[각주:249]," Ms Sobchak says now, "they started talking away what^[각주:250] we already had." Andrei Sinyavsky, a writer jailed for anti-Soviet propaganda, quipped after^[각주:251] emigrating to^[각주:252] France in the 1973 that his "differences with the Soviet regime were purely of a stylistic nature". The new generation increasingly defines itself by such stylistic differences, rather than through any sort of political cohesiveness^[각주:253]. But style in Russia often becomes politics. 

Gorbachev's grandchildren have never had to worry about being left penniless^[각주:254] and that means they are less bothered about money. Success in the 1990s meant having a chauffeur^[각주:255], shopping in London and eating at $200-a-head restaurants^[각주:256]. To be cool today is to use car-sharing, attend a public lecture about urbanism^[각주:257] or make your own way around India. "I prefer cycling around Kaliningrad to going by car," says Anton Alikhanov, the city-'s 31-year-old governor. "And I don't understand why investors want to put money into^[각주:258] building another three floors of a house, instead of increasing the value of their properties by cultivating public space^[각주:259]."

Value judgments^[각주:260]

Many care instead about what they can accomplish professionally^[각주:261] rather than what they can get and about what they share, not what they own. They do not envy Mr Putin's cronies who live behind high fences, fly on private jets and have built special rooms for their fur coats. They ridicule them^[각주:262]. 

They hate the propaganda of state television, which for a long time was one of the main instruments of social control. It now irritates people more than the stagnating economy^[각주:263], according to Lev Gudkov of the Levada Center, a think-tank. They live online in a world of individual voices. They speak a direct language. Hence the success of^[각주:264] Yuri Dud, whose YouTube interviews of people with something to say, be they politicians, actors or rappers, are watched by millions. These are neither pro- nor anti-Kremlin but are simply outside the system. There was a similar striving for^[각주:265] sincerity in^[각주:266] the early 1960s when a plain, living language seemed an antidote to^[각주:267] Soviet bombast^[각주:268]. It is another thing Mr Gorbachev's grandchildren and the men of the sixties have in common^[각주:269]. 

Mr Gorbachev drew his support from a vast number of scientists and engineers who had time and skill but lacked prospects^[각주:270]. Today, the demand for change is coming from an army of young entrepreneurs who want a system regulated by rules^[각주:271] and open to competition. For people like Mr Ovchinnikov, business has become a form of activism^[각주:272]. Openness is^[각주:273] both his core business principle and selling point^[각주:274]. 

Mr Ovchinnikov turned Dodo's growth into^[각주:275] something resembling a reality television show through^[각주:276] a blog called Sila Uma (Brainpower^[각주:277]). Both investors and customers watched Dodo deliver^[각주:278] both pizza and profits in real time^[각주:279]. "We wanted to prove that you can be honest and transparent in Russia." Within a few years Dodo, largely crowdfunded through^[각주:280] the internet, employed 10,000 people. Mr Ovchinnikov and others like him treat transparency not as a risk, but as a way of protecting themselves from the system. 

"There are two parallel countries^[각주:281]," Mr Ovchinnikov says. "There is a country of smart and energetic people who want to make it open and competitive. And there is another country of security servicemen who drive in black SUVs extorting^[각주:282] rents^[각주:283]." The two clashed when^[각주:284], earlier this year, Mr Ovchinnikov was accused of pushing drugs after^[각주:285] the staff of one of his pizza joints in Moscow reported finding drugs in a lavatory that had, in fact, been plated by criminals with police protection^[각주:286] apparently in order to extract a bribe or ruin his business. Mr Ovchinnikov gave his side of the raid through^[각주:287] social media and the story went viral^[각주:288]. It was picked up by Mr Navalny who mentioned it in one of his YouTune videos. A few weeks later the prosecutors backed off^[각주:289]. 

That will not always be the case. Part of North's logic of the "natural state" is that when parents get scarce the role of violence goes up. Many young Russians see a job in the security services as the only social lift available^[각주:290]. A recent survey found that more than 75% of people under the age of 30 find a security-service job attractive and 50% would like their children to have one. And which way the spooks^[각주:291] turn^[각주:292] will affect Russia's future. Many FSB officers are apparently in "suitcase" mood, ready to switch sides if necessary. But some are more ideological^[각주:293], and therefore more dangerous. 

Last autumn, young FSB officers in a unit called the "Service for the Protection of Constitutional Order and the Fight Against Terrorism" arrested several anarchists and left-wing anti-fascists, accused them of trying to "destabilize the political situation in^[각주:294] the country" and subjected them to torture^[각주:295] and humiliation^[각주:296]. As one victim was told as he was tasered^[각주:297]: "You must understand, an FSB officer^[각주:298] always gets what he wants." Social-media profiles of some of those officers revealed their ultra-nationalist views^[각주:299]. None of them has been charged^[각주:300] or dismissed^[각주:301]. 

The impunity that^[각주:302] the security services have gained under Mr Putin has reversed Mr Gorbachev's main principle^[각주:303]: individual life and human values take precedence over^[각주:304] the purposes of the state. Gorbachev's grandchildren want those values back. "The current state system is not only incompetent^[각주:305]. It is immoral^[각주:306]," says Mr Gabuev. "A state should be a service, not an idol^[각주:307]."

Vote for change

The young elite is resentful of^[각주:308] pretence^[각주:309], simulation and cynicism^[각주:310] - the staple of the current system^[각주:311]. Instead they crave^[각주:312] convictions^[각주:313] and ideas. This was one reason why many Russians refused to cast a ballot on^[각주:314] March 18th. Neither Mr Gabuev nor Mr Ovchinnikov saw any point in going to the polls. Ms Mostinskaya, by contrast^[각주:315], did. "Participation gives you a right to act in the future," she says. Rather than backing one of the candidates, she spoiled her ballot paper^[각주:316] by scribbling on the top^[각주:317]: "One day, even if not now, all this will change."

1. general secretary ; (옛 소련 공산당의) 서기장; (중국 공산당의) 총서기; (g- s-) 사무국장[총장], 사무장, 간사장. [본문으로]
2. trim ; 3. [주로 수동태로] ~ sth (with sth) (특히 가장자리를) 장식하다 [본문으로]
3. by extension ; (격식) 더 나아가 [본문으로]
4. ranks ; [명사] (집단 따위에 소속된) 사람들(복수형으로 사용) [본문으로]
5. be dubbed ; ~로 불리다 [본문으로]
6. hearse ; 1. 영구차, 장의용(用) 마차[자동차] ;; 2. [시어·고어] 관(coffin); 묘 ;; 3. (가톨릭) 다지(多枝) 촛대 ;; 미국식 [hɜ:rs] 영국식 [hɜ:s] [본문으로]
7. rejuvenate ; [동사] 다시 젊어 보이게[젊은 기분이 들게] 하다, 활기를 되찾게 하다 ;; 미국·영국 [rɪ|dƷu:vəneɪt] [본문으로]
8. dacha ; (러시아의) 시골 저택, 별장. (또는 datcha) ;; 미국∙영국 [|dӕtʃə] [본문으로]
9. snow-covered ; [형용사] [보통 ] 눈으로 덮인(snow-clad) [본문으로]
10. sum (sth/sb) up ; 1. ~을 압축해서 보여주다[묘사하다] ;; 2. ~에 대해 파악[판단]하다 참고 summing-up [본문으로]
11. glasnost ; [명사] (구소련의) 정보 공개, 글라스노스트 [본문으로]
12. perestroika ; [명사] [U] 페레스트로이카 ((구소련에서의 Gorbachev의 개혁 정책; cf. GLASNOST)) ;; 미국·영국 [pèrəstrɔ́ikə] [본문으로]
13. deception ; 1. [U] 속임, 기만, 사기 ;; 2. [C] 속임수 [본문으로]
14. repression ; [U] 1. 탄압, 진압, 억압 ;; 2. (감정・욕구의) 억압[억누름] [본문으로]
15. unwittingly ; [부사] 자신도 모르게, 부지불식간에 [본문으로]
16. unwillingly ; [부사] 마지못해, 본의 아니게 [본문으로]
17. emergence ; [U] 1. 출현; (문제 등의) 발생. ;; 2. (위기·역경 따위로부터의) 탈출 [본문으로]
18. turbulence ; 1. [U] (풍파 따위의) 사나움; (마음의) 동요, 격동; (인심·사회 따위의) 혼란, 동란, 소동. ;; 2. [U, C] (수력학) 교란 운동, 교류(攪流). ;; 3. [U, C] (기상) 난기류(亂氣流). (또는 turbulency) [본문으로]
19. economic decline ; 경기 하락 [본문으로]
20. breakdown ; 1. [[C]] (기계·열차 등의) 고장, 파손 ;; 2. [[CU]] 붕괴, 몰락(downfall), 와해 ;; 3. [CU] (교섭 등의) 결렬; 좌절; (정신·육체 등의) 쇠약 [본문으로]
21. perestroika ; [명사] [U] 페레스트로이카 ((구소련에서의 Gorbachev의 개혁 정책; cf. GLASNOST)) ;; ORIGIN ; Russian = restructure ;; 미국∙영국 [pèrəstrɔ́ikə] [본문으로]
22. criss-cross ; [VERB] If a person or thing criss-crosses an area, they travel from one side to the other and back again many times, following different routes. If a number of things criss-cross an area, they cross it, and cross over each other. [본문으로]
23. brief ; (briefed[-t]) 1. …을 요약하다, …의 요점을 보고하다. ;; 2. (법률) 〔소송 사건〕의 적요서를 작성하다; 《英》 …에게 변호를 의뢰하다. ;; 3. (군사) 〔출격 직전의 비행사 등〕에게 간결하게 지시를 내리다. ;; 4. …에게 지시를 내리다; …에게 요점을 말하다, 브리핑하다[on]. [본문으로]
24. government official ; 공무원, 관(공)리 [본문으로]
25. cultivate ; 4. <재능·품성·습관 등을> 양성하다(develop); 교화하다, 계발하다; <예술·학술 등을> 장려하다, …의 발달에 노력하다; <문학·기예를> 닦다, 연마하다 ;; 5. <친구·교제를> 구하다, 깊게 하다, …와 친분을 가지려 하다 [본문으로]
26. policymaker ; [명사] 정책 입안자[담당자] [본문으로]
27. thrash out ; [동사] (해결책 따위를) 궁리[토의]하다, 철저히 검토하다; 털어놓다. ;; 동의어 ; thresh out, find an answer to by talking. [본문으로]
28. actionable ; 2. [한정 용법] 실행 가능한, 이용할 수 있는; [서술 용법] 곧 사용할 수 있는. [본문으로]
29. come to[into] power ; 정권을 장악하다, 집권하다 [본문으로]
30. be born into[of] ; ~(집안, 가문)에서 태어나다 [본문으로]
31. repugnance ; 1. [[U]] [종종 a ~] 혐오(aversion), 싫증, 증오, 반감 ((to, for, toward, against)) ;; 2. [[UC/]] 모순, 불일치 ((of, between, to, with)) [본문으로]
32. annexation ; 1. [U] 부가; (특히 새 영토의) 합병. ;; 2. 합병물; 합병지; 부가물; 첨가물. [본문으로]
33. last[final] straw ; [the ~] (더 이상 견디지 못하게 되는) 마지막의 얼마 안 되는 부가물[부담], 인내의 한계를 넘게 하는 것 ;; 최후의 결정타[더 이상 견딜 수 없는 한계] ;; 동의어 ; the straw that breaks the camel’s back ;; (하중(荷重)에 견디지 못하게 되는) 마지막의 한가닥 무게 [본문으로]
34. local council ; (법률) 지방의회(地方議會) [본문으로]
35. pledge ; 1. [UC/] 맹세, 서약, 언질; (정부·정당 등의) 공약; [the ~] 금주의 맹세 [본문으로]
36. empower ; 1. (법률상) …에게 권능[권한]을 부여하다, …할 권력을 위임하다(authorize) ;; 2. …할 수 있도록 하다(enable), …할 능력[자격]을 주다, (…할 것을) …에게 허용하다 [본문으로]
37. the Arctic Circle ; 북극권 [본문으로]
38. appear in ; …에 나타나다[등장하다]. [본문으로]
39. commercial ; [명사] (텔레비전・라디오의) 광고 (방송) [본문으로]
40. advert ; 동의어 ADVERTISEMENT(cf. AD) [본문으로]
41. disgruntled ; [형용사] ~ (at sb/sth) 불만스러워 하는, 언짢은 [본문으로]
42. old-timer ; 1. (클럽・조직의) 고참; (어떤 곳에) 오래 산 사람 ;; 2. (美) (남자) 노인 [본문으로]
43. regeneration ; 1. (정신적·도덕적인) 갱생, 신생 ;; 2. 재건, 부흥, 부활 ;; 3. 개혁, 쇄신; 재생 ;; 4. (생물·전자) 재생 [본문으로]
44. date of birth ; 출 생년월일. 참고 ; DOB [본문으로]
45. forge ; 1. 〔쇠〕를 벼리다; 벼려서 (…을) 만들다[into], 단조하다. ;; 동의어 ; MAKE ;; 2. (노력하여) 만들어내다; 〔계획 따위〕를 세우다, 안출하다; 〔관계·우정〕을 구축하다[쌓다]. ;; 3. 〔거짓말 따위〕를 지어내다, 날조하다, 꾸며내다. ;; 동의어 ; MAKE [본문으로]
46. contemporary ; (pl. -ies) (어떤 사람과) 동년배[동시대인] [본문으로]
47. be sucked into ; ~(소용돌이 등에) 에 빨려들다 ;; (비유적) 매료되다, 몰입하다 [본문으로]
48. vortex ; (pl. vor・texes 또는 vor・ti・ces / -tIsiːz /) 1. (전문 용어) (물・공기 등의) 소용돌이 ;; 2. (문예체) (비유적인 의미의) 소용돌이 [본문으로]
49. social change ; (정치학) <용어>사회변동(社會變動) [본문으로]
50. elite ; 1. (the elite) 《집합적 ; 단·복수 양용》 선발된 사람들, 엘리트; 최상류층 사람들; (사회의) 중추, 정예. [본문으로]
51. traumatize ; [타동사][VN] [주로 수동태로] 정신적 외상을 초래하다, 엄청난 충격을 주다 [본문으로]
52. reversal ; [UC/] 1. 반전(反轉), 전도; 역전, 되돌아옴 ;; 2. (법) (하급심 판결의) 취소, 파기 ;; 3. (사진) 반전 (현상) [본문으로]
53. vocal ; 2. (의견을) 강경하게 밝히는, 소리 높여 항의하는 [본문으로]
54. imbue ; [타동사][VN] [흔히 수동태로] ~ sb/sth (with sth) (격식) (강한 감정・의견・가치를) 가득 채우다 [본문으로]
55. entitlement ; (격식) 1. [U] ~ (to sth) (공식적인) 자격[권리] ;; 2. [C] 가질[받을] 자격[권리]가 있는 것[양] ;; 3. [C] (美) (특정 집단을 위한 정부의) 재정 지원 혜택 [본문으로]
56. aborted ; 1. 유산된 ;; 2. (생물) 발육 부전의 ;; 3. 실패한 [본문으로]
57. transition ; [UC/] 1. 변천, 이행, 변화 ((from; to)) [본문으로]
58. resistance ; 1. [U , sing.] ~ (to sb/sth) (계획・생각 등에 대한) 저항[반대] [본문으로]
59. embody ; 1. (정신에) 형태를 부여하다; (사상·감정 따위를 예술 작품·말 따위로) 구체적으로 표현하다, 구체화하다; 체현(體現)하다 ;; 2. 합체시키다, 포괄하다; 포함하다, 수록(收錄)하다 [본문으로]
60. rule ; 5. GOVERNMENT/CONTROL | [U] 통치, 지배 ;; 참고 ; home rule [본문으로]
61. dissatisfaction ; [U](…에 대한) 불만, 불평[at, with]; [C]불만[불평]의 원인 (discontent)(with). [본문으로]
62. aggression ; [UC/] (정당한 이유 없는) 침략, 공격, 침해 ((on)); 호전성; [정신의학] 공격성 [본문으로]
63. underpin ; (underpinned ; - pinning) 1. …의 토대를 바꾸다, 기초를 보강하다 ; 기초의 일부를 만들다. ;; 2. …을 떠받치다(support), 지지하다, 입증하다. [본문으로]
64. preside over ; to lead or be in charge of a meeting, ceremony, etc. [본문으로]
65. power structure ; 1. 권력 구조[기구] ;; 2. 권력 기구를 만드는 사람, 권력층의 실권자들 [본문으로]
66. political economist ; [명사] (정치) 경제학자. [본문으로]
67. siloviki ; Plural form of silovik ;; (politics) A Russian politician from the old security or military services, often the KGB, FSB, and military officers or other security services who came into power during the 1990s or 2000s. [본문으로]
68. assorted ; 1. 분류한, 구분한; 구색을 갖춘; 잡다한(varied); (비스킷 따위를 한 상자에) 여러 가지 모은 ;; 2. 어울리는, 조화된 [본문으로]
69. police force ; (한 국가・지역・시・군의) 경찰 ;; 경찰대; [U]경찰력 [본문으로]
70. crumble ; 3. [자동사][V] ~ (into/to sth) | ~ (away) (힘・조직 등이) 흔들리다[무너지다] [본문으로]
71. quirk ; 1. (사람의 성격에서) 별난 점; 기벽 ;; 2. 기이한 일[우연] [본문으로]
72. demography ; [U] (어느 사회의 일정 기간에 걸친) 인구 변동[동태]; (이러한 것을 연구하는) 인구 통계학 [본문으로]
73. academic ; 1. 대학생, 대학교수; 학구적인 사람 ;; 2. 학사원 회원 ;; 3. [pl.] 학과, 학문 ;; 4. [A~] 플라톤 학파의 사람 [본문으로]
74. demonstrable ; [형용사] (격식) 보여줄[입증할] 수 있는 ;; 논증할 수 있는; 명백한 [본문으로]
75. in power ; 권력의 자리에 있는, 정권을 쥐고 있는. ;; 참고 ; out of (the) power [본문으로]
76. carry on ; 1. (특히 英) 계속 가다[움직이다] ;; to continue doing something or moving in a particular direction, without stopping [본문으로]
77. governance ; 1. 지배, 통치, 통할, 관리(government, rule, control). ;; 2. 통치방식, 관리법. [본문으로]
78. disenfranchise ; [타동사][VN] (특히 선거권 등의) 권리 박탈 ;; [VERB] To disenfranchise a group of people means to take away their right to vote, or their right to vote for what they really want. [본문으로]
79. dissatisfy ; [타동사] (-fied) 불만을 느끼게 하다, 불평을 갖게 하다 [본문으로]
80. cynicism ; 1. 비꼼, 냉소(하는 버릇) ; 빈정대는[비꼬는] 말. ;; 2. [C-] (철학) 시닉주의, 견유 철학. [본문으로]
81. overshadow ; 1. 그늘지게 하다, …위에 그림자를 던지다, …을 어둡게 하다. ;; 2. [비유적] …의 모습을 희미하게 하다, …을 못해 보이게 하다. ;; 3. [비유적] …에 어두운 그림자를 던지다, …을 우울하게 하다. ;; 4. [고어] …을 보호하다. [본문으로]
82. rhetoric ; [U] 1. 수사법, 화려한 문체; 미사(美辭); 과장 ;; 2. 수사학; 웅변; 웅변술, 수사적 기교 ;; 3. 작문법, 문장법 ;; 4. 설득력, 매력 ;; ORIGIN ; Greek 「이야기하다」의 뜻에서 [본문으로]
83. on the face of it ; (겉으로) 보기에는[표면적으로는] [본문으로]
84. prospect ; 1. [보통 a[the] ~] 전망, 조망(眺望); 경치(scene); (집의) 방위, 향 ;; 2. [[U]] 가망 ((of)), 가능성, 기대, 예상 ;; 3-a. [pl.] 성공할 가망; 가망이 있는[유망한] 사람 ;; 3-b. [pl.] 출세할 가망, 장래성 ;; 4. [주로 미] 단골손님이 될 것 같은 사람; 기부할 듯한 사람 ;; 5. 관찰, 고찰 ;; 6. [광산] 채광 유망지; 광석 견본; 광석 산출 예상, 예상 채굴량 [본문으로]
85. bureaucratic ; (흔히 못마땅함) 관료의; 관료주의적인; 요식적인 [본문으로]
86. at one's beck and call ; ~가 명령만 하면 달려가는[~의 명령만 기다리는] ;; …가 필요할 때 항상 옆에 있는. ;; be at sb's beck and call ; …의 의도[지시]대로 하다, …이 시키는 대로 하다. [본문으로]
87. status quo ; [sing.] (라틴어에서) 현재의 상황, 현상(現狀) ;; (state in which anything was or is)(cf. in status quo). [본문으로]
88. civil servant ; 1. (군 관계 이외의) 문관, 공무원 ;; 2. (국제 연합 등의) 행정 사무관 [본문으로]
89. cajole ; 〔남〕을 감언으로 속이다; 〔남〕을 치켜세우다; 〔남〕을 속여[치켜 세워] …하게[못하게] 하다[into, out of]. ;; If you cajole someone into doing something, you get them to do it after persuading them for some time. [본문으로]
90. preelection ; [명사] [U, C] 예선(豫選). ;; [형용사] 선거 전(前)의. (또는 pre-election) [본문으로]
91. thuggery ; [U] (격식) 폭력 행위 [본문으로]
92. credible ; 믿을 만한, 신용[신뢰]할 수 있는, 확실한; 설득력이 있는. [본문으로]
93. plausible ; 1. (구실 따위가) 그럴싸한, 진실[정말] 같은. ;; 2. 말재주 있는, 그럴 듯하게 말하는. [본문으로]
94. bar ; 2. BLOCK | (길을) 막다[차단하다] ;; 3. PREVENT | ~ sb (from sth/from doing sth) ~에게 (~하는 것을) 금(지)하다 [본문으로]
95. engineer ; 1. (흔히 못마땅함) 수작을 부리다, (일을) 꾀하다[획책하다] ;; 2. [주로 수동태로] (설계해서) 제작하다 ;; 3. 유전자를 조작하다 [본문으로]
96. fraud ; 1. [U , C] 사기(죄) ;; 2. [C] 사기꾼 ;; 3. [C] 가짜, 엉터리 [본문으로]
97. sufferance ; [U] 1. 묵인; (특히, 악·불법에 대한) 용인, 관용 ;; 2. (고통·고난 등의) 인내력 ;; 3. [고어] 인종(忍從); 고난, 고통 [본문으로]
98. as opposed to ; (격식) …와는 대조적으로; …이 아니라 [본문으로]
99. central ; [형용사] 1. 중심되는, 가장 중요한 [본문으로]
100. undermine ; [vn] 1. (특히 자신감・권위 등을) 약화시키다 ;; 2. 기반을 약화시키다 [본문으로]
101. legitimacy ; [U] 1. 적법[합법] (성), 정당성. ;; 2. 적출(嫡出); 정통(성), 정계(正系). [본문으로]
102. abstain ; [자동사] 1. 삼가다, 절제하다, 그만두다, 끊다; 금주하다 ((from)) ;; 동의어 refrain ;; 2. 기권하다 ((from)) [본문으로]
103. apathy ; [U, C] 무감동, 무감정; 냉담, 무관심(indifference). [본문으로]
104. polling station ; [명사] 투표소[장] [본문으로]
105. back ; 2. SUPPORT | [타동사][VN] 도와주다, 지지[원조/후원]하다 [본문으로]
106. deflate ; 2. [타동사][VN] [흔히 수동태로] 기를 꺾다[죽이다] ;; (참고: inflate ( 3 ), reflate) [본문으로]
107. uncork ; 1. (병의) 마개를 뽑다 ;; 2. <감정 등을> 토로하다, <말 등을> 입 밖에 내다 ;; 3. 세차게 내뿜다[내쏟다] [본문으로]
108. ritual ; [C , U][명사] 2. (항상 규칙적으로 행하는) 의식과 같은[의례적인] 일 ;; [본문으로]
109. The European Council on Foreign Relations ; The European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) is a pan-European think tank with offices in seven European capitals.[2] Launched in October 2007, it conducts research and aims to promote informed debate across Europe on the development of coherent and effective European values based foreign policy. [본문으로]
110. constitutionally ; 1. 헌법상, 입헌적으로 ; 합법적으로(legally). ;; 2. 체질[소질]상, 천성적으로(naturally). [본문으로]
111. be dominated by ; ~가 지배(장악)하다 [본문으로]
112. succession ; 3. [U] (지위·신분·재산 등의) 계승, 상속 ((to)); [U] 계승[상속]권; 왕위 계승권; [C] [집합적] 상속자들, 자손(posterity) ((to)) [본문으로]
113. departure ; 3. [비유적] (…에게 있어서의) (새로운) 시도, 방침[for]; (…의) 발전, 기원[in]. [본문으로]
114. sole ; [명사 앞에만 씀] 1. 유일한, 단 하나의 [본문으로]
115. objective ; (pl. objectives[-z]) 1. 목적, 목표.;; 동의어 PURPOSE [본문으로]
116. ossified ; 골화한; 뼈가 된; 경직화된; [속어] 곤드레가 된 ;; ossify ; [자, 타동사] 2. 경직화하다; 무정하게[보수적으로] 하다[되다] [본문으로]
117. grow old ; 차차 나이들다, 늙다 [본문으로]
118. purge ; (조직에서 사람을, 흔히 폭력적인 방법으로) 제거[숙청] [본문으로]
119. denounce ; [vn], (참고: denunciation) 1. ~ sb/sth (as sth) 맹렬히 비난하다 ;; 2. ~ sb (as sth) (불법적인 정치 활동에 대해) 고발하다 [본문으로]
120. Prague ; [명사] 프라하 ((체코의 수도)) ;; 미국∙영국 [prɑ́:ɡ] [본문으로]
121. ideologically ; 사상적으로, 이념적으로 ;; 관념적으로, 공상적으로. [본문으로]
122. intellectually ; [부사] 지적으로, 이지적으로; 지성에 관해서는. [본문으로]
123. alternative ; 1. [+of+doing] 양자 간의 선택, 양자택일 ;; 2. (그 하나를) 선택해야 할 둘[두 개] ;; 3. 달리 취할 방도, 대안(代案) [본문으로]
124. portray as ; …로서 그리다[묘사하다]. [본문으로]
125. cut-throat ; [형용사] (주로 명사 앞에 씀) 활동이 경쟁이 치열한, 먹느냐 먹히느냐의 [본문으로]
126. cunning ; [U] 1. 교활, 간사; 약삭빠름. ;; 2. [고어] 능력, 솜씨, 기량, 교묘함(*우리말의 「커닝」은 cheating (at[or in] an exam)). [본문으로]
127. ruthlessness ; [명사] 무자비함; 잔인함. [본문으로]
128. integrity ; [U] 1. 고결, 성실, 정직, 청렴 ;; 2. 완전(한 상태), 흠 없음, 보전(保全); 본래의 모습 ;; ORIGIN Latin ;;「완전」의 뜻에서 [본문으로]
129. measure ; 4. WAY OF SHOWING/JUDGING | [C] (판단・측정의) 척도[기준] [본문으로]
130. acquire ; 2. <지식·학문 등을 노력하여> 얻다, 배우다, 습득하다; <습관 등을> 몸에 익히다, 지니게 되다 ;; 동의어 get ;; ORIGIN Latin ;「덧붙여 구하다」의 뜻에서 [본문으로]
131. attribute ; 1. 속성(屬性) ; 특질(特質)(characteristic). ;; 2. (관직·자격 따위의 상징이 되는) 부수물, 딸린 물건(symbol). [본문으로]
132. norm ; 2. [pl.] norms 규범, 규준, (경영) 규준/규범 [본문으로]
133. postrevolutionary ;; Occurring after a period of revolution. (q, Often capitalized when referring to a specific revolution.) [본문으로]
134. disoriented ; [형용사] [미] 혼란에 빠진; 방향 감각을 잃은 [본문으로]
135. be robbed of sth ; ~을 강탈당하다 [본문으로]
136. social status ; 사회적 지위. [본문으로]
137. saving ; 2. [pl.] savings 저축한 돈, 저금, 예금 [본문으로]
138. exploit ; 1. 〔자원〕을 개발하다, 개척하다; …을 이용[활용]하다; 〔신제품 따위〕를 선전하다, 판촉하다. ;; 2. [경멸적] 〔남〕을 이용해 먹다; 〔노동력〕을 착취하다. [본문으로]
139. prompt ; 2. 생각나게 하다(suggest), (사상·감정을) 불어넣다(inspire), 지령하다(dictate). [본문으로]
140. consolidate ; 1. (세력 있는 위치・성공의 가능성 등을) 굳히다[강화하다] [본문으로]
141. legacy ; (pl. -ies) 1. (죽은 사람이 남긴) 유산 ;; 2. (과거의) 유산 [본문으로]
142. demonize (英 또한 -ise) ; [타동사][VN] 악마로 만들다[묘사하다] ;; 미국∙영국 [|di:mənaɪz] [본문으로]
143. restoration ; 2. (제도 따위의) 부흥, 재흥 ; (영토·상태 등의) 회복, 복구. [본문으로]
144. anthem ; 1. (국가・단체 등에 중요한 의미가 있는) 노래[–가] ; 참고 national anthem ;; 2. (흔히 오르간 반주에 맞춰 부르는) 성가[찬송가] [본문으로]
145. suppression ; [U] 1. (반란 등의) 억압, 진압, 탄압 ;; 2. (감정 등의) 억제 ;; 3. (출혈·유출 등을) 막음 ;; 4. (사실 등의) 은폐, 감추기 ;; 5. (출판·발매의) 금지; 일부 삭제 ;; 6. (정신의학) (충동 따위의) 억제 [본문으로]
146. redistribution ; [U, C] 1. 재분배, 재배급, 재배포; 〈경제〉 재분배 [본문으로]
147. asset ; 2. [주로 복수로] (특히 부동산과 같은) 자산, 재산 ;; 참고 ; liability [본문으로]
148. rent ; [명사] [U, C] 1. 지대(地代), 소작료; 집세, 방세; (기계·설비의) 임대료, 사용료. ;; 2. (경제) (부동산의) 수익. [본문으로]
149. patron ; 1. (예술가·자선 사업 등의) 보호자, 후원자, 지지자, 은인 ;; 2. (호텔·상점 등의) 단골손님, 고객 ;; ORIGIN Latin ;;「보호자」의 뜻에서 [본문으로]
150. cohort ; [C+sing./pl. v.] 1. (전문 용어) (통계적으로 동일한 특색이나 행동 양식을 공유하는) 집단, 그룹, 대(隊), 단(團). ;; 2. (못마땅함) (어떤 사람의) 지지자, 한패, 동료, 동아리; 공범자. [본문으로]
151. technocrat ; [명사] 테크노크라트(많은 권력을 행사하는 과학 기술 분야 전문가) ;; 미국·영국 [|teknəkrӕt] [본문으로]
152. generational shift ; 세대교체, 세대적 변화 [본문으로]
153. modernization ; [U] 현대화, 근대화 [본문으로]
154. upset ; 1. 뒤엎다(overthrow) ;; 2. (계획 따위를) 망쳐 놓다, 실패하게 하다 [본문으로]
155. social unrest ; 사회 불안, 사회적 불안 [본문으로]
156. deference ; [U] 존중[경의](을 표하는 행동) ;; [U] 복종; 존경, 경의 ((to, for)) [본문으로]
157. deputy minister ; 부차관, 부총리 ;; Deputy minister is a title borne by politicians or officials in certain countries governed under a parliamentary system. In some countries a "Deputy minister" is a junior minister, who is assigned to assist a specific cabinet minister. [본문으로]
158. entitlement ; (격식) 1. [U] ~ (to sth) (공식적인) 자격[권리] ;; 2. [C] 가질[받을] 자격[권리]가 있는 것[양] ;; 3. [C] (美) (특정 집단을 위한 정부의) 재정 지원 혜택 [본문으로]
159. allocate ; <일·임무 등을> 할당하다; <이익 등을> 배분하다(assign) ((to)); 배치하다 ((to)); [컴퓨터] …에 할당하다 ;; ORIGIN Latin ;「장소에 두다」의 뜻에서 [본문으로]
160. merit ; 3. [U, C] (merits) 공적, 공훈, 훈공, 공로; 〈가톨릭〉 공덕. ;; 5. (종종 merits) (상응하는) 상[벌], 공죄(功罪), 공과(功過); 진가(眞價). [본문으로]
161. conditional ; 1. 조건이 붙은, 조건부의, 제한이 따른, 제약적인 ; 잠정적인, 가정(假定)적인(not absolute). ;; 2. (…을) 조건으로 한, …에 따라 결정되는(on). [본문으로]
162. property right ; 재산권 [본문으로]
163. crony ; 친한 친구, 옛친구; 《경멸적》 좋지 않은 친구; 추종자, 측근, 패거리. ;; 동의어 FRIEND [본문으로]
164. head ; 1. …의 선두에 서다; …의 첫머리에 있다[두다]; 인솔[지휘]하다; …의 장(長)이다 [본문으로]
165. service chief ; (군사) 각 군 총장(各軍總長) [본문으로]
166. staple ; [명사] 4. (한 국가의) 주요 산물 ;; 5. ~ (of sth) 주요소, 주성분 [본문으로]
167. generational shift ; 세대교체 [본문으로]
168. unconditional ; 무조건의, 무제한의, 절대적인(absolute). [본문으로]
169. historian ; [명사] 사학자, 역사가 ;; HELP ; historian의 첫 글자인 h를 발음하지 않고, 그 앞에 a가 아닌 an을 쓰는 사람들도 있지만 이제는 이런 발음이 구식으로 여겨진다. [본문으로]
170. yearning ; [C , U] ~ (for sb/sth) | ~ (to do sth) (격식) 갈망, 동경 ;; strong desire, wishful longing [본문으로]
171. transfer ; transfer ; 1-a. [UC/] 이전(移轉), 이동, 전임; 이동 수단[방법] ;; 1-b. [법] [U] (권리·증권 등의) 이전; 양도; [C] 양도 증서 [본문으로]
172. emulate ; 1. …와 경쟁하다, 우열을 다투다[겨루다] ;; 2. 열심히 흉내내다[모방하다] ;; 3. …에 필적하다 ;; 4. (컴퓨터) <다른 프로그램을> 에뮬레이트하다, 모방하다 [본문으로]
173. oppose ; 1. …에 반대하다, 이의를 제기하다 ;; 2. …에 대항하다, 저지하다, 방해하다 ;; ORIGIN ; Latin 「…의 상대에 놓다」의 뜻에서 [본문으로]
174. tactics ; 1. [단수 취급] 전술(학), 병법, 용병 ; 참고 strategy ;; 2. [복수 취급] 작전 행동 ;; 3. [단수 취급] 술책, 책략 [본문으로]
175. vision ; 2. [U] (시인·정치가 등의) 상상력, 직감력, 통찰력, 비전 ;; 3. 보이는 것, 눈에 비치는 것, 모양, 광경; 일견(glimpse) ;; 사전에는 "미래에 대한 청사진" 정도의 의미를 가질때는 불가산으로 되어 있지만 가산으로 활용한 것을 확인 [본문으로]
176. be subject to the law ; 법의 적용을 받다. [본문으로]
177. rule of law ; [the ~] 법(에 의한 지배), 법규(범) [본문으로]
178. alienate ; [타동사] 1. …을 멀리하다, 소원하게 하다, 불화하게 하다; …을 소외하다. [본문으로]
179. retribution ; 1. 앙갚음, 보복(requital) ; 징벌(懲罰)(punishment). ;; 2. (종교) (내세에 받는) 응보, 천벌. [본문으로]
180. complete ; [형용사] 2 완전한(perfect), 전적인 [본문으로]
181. overhaul ; (기계・시스템의) 점검[정비] [본문으로]
182. beneficiary ; 1. 이익[은혜]을 받는 사람. ;; 2. (법률) (신탁) 수익자, (유산 등의) 수취인, (연금 등의) 수령인. [본문으로]
183. reprisal ; [C , U] 보복, 앙갚음 [본문으로]
184. halfway house ; 1. (두 고을 등의) 중간 쯤에 있는 주막; 잠정적인 장소 ;; 2. 타협, 타협점, 타협안 ;; 3. 사회 복귀 (훈련) 시설 ((출감자·정신 장애자 등을 위한)) ;; 4. (진행의) 중간점; (개혁 등의) 전단계 종료점 [본문으로]
185. to[till] the last[end] ; 최후까지; 죽을 때까지 [본문으로]
186. an appetite for ; …에의 욕구. [본문으로]
187. opposition ; 3. [sing.+ sing./pl. v.] the Opposition (제1) 야당; 야당들 [본문으로]
188. coalition ; 1. [C+sing./pl. v.] (둘 이상의 정당으로 구성된) 연립 정부, 연정 ;; 2. [C+sing./pl. v.] (특히 정치적인) 연합체 ;; 3. [U] 연합 [본문으로]
189. lieutenant colonel ; [명사] (미국 육군・공군, 영국 육군의) 중령 [본문으로]
190. in the shadow of ; 1. …의 아주 가까이에 ;; 2. (다른 사람의) 그늘에 가려(그 사람만큼 관심을 받지 못한다는 뜻) [본문으로]
191. be associated with ; ~와 관련되다, 연관되다 [본문으로]
192. obscurantism ; [U] (격식) 반계몽주의 ;; [U] 몽매주의, 개화 반대론; (문학·예술에서의) 고의로 의도를 애매하게 하는 표현주의 ;; (문학·미술 따위의) 난해(難解)주의 (의도적으로 난해·불명료하게 함) [본문으로]
193. loyalist ; 1. 충신, 애국자 ; (특히 반란 때의) 현 체제 지지자 [본문으로]
194. come of age ; 1. 성년이 되다 ;; 참고 ; coming of age ;; 2. (무엇이) 발달한 상태가 되다 [본문으로]
195. patronage ; 1. 지원, 후원, 보호(support, protection), 찬조, 장려. ;; 4. (정당의 당원을 관직이나 당의 역원으로 임명하는) 임명권, 서임권 ; (그러한 권한 내에 있는) 관직, 역원직. [본문으로]
196. cadre ; 2. (종교 단체·정당 등의 조직의) 핵심 그룹, 간부회; (조직 확대의 핵심이 되는) 지도자 집단 ;; 3. (특히 공산주의 국가의) 중핵; (당·정부·군의) 간부; 중견 요원 ;; 미국식 [|kӕdri] 영국식 [|kɑ:də(r)] [본문으로]
197. technocrat ; [명사] 테크노크라트(많은 권력을 행사하는 과학 기술 분야 전문가) [본문으로]
198. shore (sth) up ; 1. (건물 등에) 지주를 받치다 ;; 2. (넘어지지 않도록) ~을 떠받치다 ;; 강화하다 [본문으로]
199. credit ; 2. WITH ACHIEVEMENT | [타동사][VN] [주로 수동태로] ~ A with B | ~ B to A B를 A의 공으로 믿다[공이라고 말하다] ;; 3. WITH QUALITY | [타동사][VN] ~ A with B A에게 B가 있다고 믿다 [본문으로]
200. inhabitable ; 거주할 수 있는, 거주하기 알맞은, 살기에 적합한 [본문으로]
201. come to[into] power ; 정권을 장악하다, 집권하다 [본문으로]
202. apolitical ; 1. (사람이) 정치에 관심 없는 ;; 2. 어떤 정파[정당]에 관련되지 않은 ;; nonpolitical [본문으로]
203. soaring ; 높이 나는; 치솟은; 상승하는; (희망 등이) 원대한, 고매한(lofty). ;; soaring·ly 부사 [본문으로]
204. mushrooming ; [형용사] (증가가) 급격한. ;; [Noun] the act of growing suddenly and rapidly [본문으로]
205. grateful ; 1. 고맙게 여기는, 감사하는(thankful) ((to, for)); 감사를 나타내는 <편지>; 사의를 표하는 ;; 2. 고마운, 기분 좋은, 쾌적한, 반가운 [본문으로]
206. take sth/sb for granted ; [동사] 당연한 일로 여기다; 대수롭지 않게 여기다. ;; 동의어 ; accept without question; treat with careless indifference. [본문으로]
207. long for ; [동사] 열망하다, 갈망하다. ;; 동의어 ; wish, crave, yearn, desire, yen. [본문으로]
208. comfort ; [명사] 2. 위안을 주는[위로가 되는] 것, 위안자, 위문품 ; [pl.] 생활을 안락하게 해주는 물건(necessities와 luxuries의 중간), 유쾌, 즐거움. [본문으로]
209. instill (英) (美 in・still) ; [타동사][VN] (-ll-) ~ sth (in/into sb) (어떤 의식・느낌 등을 가지도록) 불어넣다[심어 주다/주입하다] [본문으로]
210. biographer ; [명사] 전기 작가 ;; 미국식 [baɪ|ɑ:grəfə(r)] 영국식 [baɪ|ɒgrəfə(r)] [본문으로]
211. inferiority ; [U]하위, 열등, 열세(↔superiority); 조악(粗惡) ;; 미국식 [ɪn|fɪri|ɔ:rəti;-|ɑ:r-] 영국식 [ɪn|fɪəri|ɒrəti] [본문으로]
212. fuel ; ((~ed; ~·ing|~led; ~·ling)) …에 연료를 보급하다, 연료를 때다; 약오르게 하다, 자극하다, <감정 등을> 부채질하다 [본문으로]
213. by[in] contrast ; 1. (《앞 문장을 받아》) 그에 반해서, 그와 대조적으로 ;; 2. …와 대조하여, …에 비해서[with] [본문으로]
214. crave ; 1. 갈망[열망]하다 ;; 2. [타동사][VN] (英 옛글투) …을 간절히 청하다 [본문으로]
215. material ; 1. [명사 앞에만 씀] (돈・재산 등의) 물질[물리]적인 [본문으로]
216. attribute ; 1. 속성(屬性) ; 특질(特質)(characteristic). ;; 2. (관직·자격 따위의 상징이 되는) 부수물, 딸린 물건(symbol). [본문으로]
217. lament ; 1. 슬퍼하다, 비탄하다, 애도하다 ;; 2. (깊이) 후회하다, 애석히 여기다, 안타까워하다 ;; ORIGIN Latin ;「울다」의 뜻에서 [본문으로]
218. public life ; [명사] 공적 생활, 공무(公務). [본문으로]
219. urban space ; [명사] (국토계획학) 도시 공간(都市空間) [본문으로]
220. bike lane ; 자전거 전용 도로 [본문으로]
221. place-holder ; 4. 관직을 얻은 사람 ((특히 정치적 지지나 원조의 보답에 의해 )) [본문으로]
222. install ; 3. ~ sb (as sth) (흔히 공식적인 의식을 거쳐) 취임시키다[임용하다] [본문으로]
223. be fitted with ~; ~이 설치되다, 장착되다. [본문으로]
224. enthusiasm for ; …에 대한 열의. [본문으로]
225. pride oneself on ; ~을 자랑하다 [본문으로]
226. 전치사(on) 다음에 동명사구에 대한 부정의 의미를 앞에 never을 써서 표현한 것을 확인 [본문으로]
227. swirl ; (빠르게) 빙빙 돌다, 소용돌이치다; 빙빙 돌게[소용돌이치게] 하다 ;; 흐름상 "(소문 등이) 퍼지다" 정도의 의미 ; 참고 ; circulate [본문으로]
228. figurehead ; 1. 명목상의 우두머리[지도자], 표면상의 대표. ;; 2. (해사) 선수상(船首像). ;; 3. [익살] (사람의) 얼굴, 상판. [본문으로]
229. prearranged ; [형용사] 미리 계획[준비]된 [본문으로]
230. swap ; [구어] 교환, 바꿔치기(exchange). [본문으로]
231. sit out ; 1. (어디 안에서 있으면서) ~이 끝나기를 기다리다 ;; 2. (춤·게임 같은 활동에서) 빠지다 ;; to not take part in a dance, game or other activity [본문으로]
232. boil over ; 1. 액체가 끓어 넘치다 ;; 2. (비격식) 화가 끓어오르다 ;; 3. 상황·감정 등이 폭발하다 [본문으로]
233. rigged ; 부정 조작된, 부정의 [본문으로]
234. parliamentary election ; [명사] 의원선거, 총선거 [본문으로]
235. go unnoticed ; 눈에 띄지 않고 넘어가다 [본문으로]
236. trigger ; 2. <일을> 일으키다, 시작케 하다, 유발하다 ((off)) [본문으로]
237. take to the streets ; 요구를 내걸고 가두 시위에 나서다 [본문으로]
238. galvanize (英 또한 -ise) ; 3. 갑자기 활기를 띠게 하다[기운이 나게 하다]; <사람을> 격려하여 (어떤 행동을) 하게 하다 ((to, into)) ;; 미국∙영국 [|gӕlvənaɪz] [본문으로]
239. it-girl ; 잇걸(it-girl은 '얼짱'에 '몸짱'까지 모두가 다 되는 매력이 있고 섹시한 여성을 말합니다.) ;; [NOUN] Journalists sometimes use It-girl to describe a young woman who is well-known because she goes to the most fashionable places and events and knows famous people. [본문으로]
240. reality television ; A genre of television programming portraying one or more people who are not professional actors and their reactions to given stimuli and/or goals. [본문으로]
241. in anger ; 화가 나서, 노하여 [본문으로]
242. turn one's[the] back on ; [동사] 저버리다, 무시하다; …으로부터 도망치다. ;; 동의어 ; forsake, neglect. [본문으로]
243. appeal to ; ~에 호소하다 [본문으로]
244. working class ; [집합적; 보통 the ~; [영]에서는 보통 the ~es] ((특히)) (육체적 노동을 하는) 임금 노동자; 노동자 계급 [본문으로]
245. public sector ; (the public sector) (경제·산업의) 공공[공익] 부문. <참고> private sector [본문으로]
246. unleash ; [타동사][VN] ~ sth (on/upon sb/sth) (강력한 반응・감정 등을) 촉발시키다[불러일으키다] [본문으로]
247. rhetoric ; 1. [U]수사학; 웅변(술); 화려한 문체; 미사(美辭); 과장, 설득력, 매력 ;; 2. [U](美)작문법, 작시법(art of composition); [C]작문 지도서 [본문으로]
248. infringe on(upon) ; ~을 침해하다 ;; to limit somebody's freedom, rights, etc. [본문으로]
249. breaking point ; [U] 한계점 [본문으로]
250. talk away ; 1. 지껄이며[시간]을 보내다 ;; 2. 줄곧 이야기하다, 수다를 떨다(chatter) [본문으로]
251. quip ; ((~ped; ~·ping)) 빈정대다, 조롱하다, 놀리다 ((about, at)) [본문으로]
252. emigrate to ; …로 이주하다. [본문으로]
253. cohesiveness ; [명사] 점착[응집]력 있음. [본문으로]
254. penniless ; (일시적으로) 무일푼의; 아주 가난한. ;; 동의어 ; POOR [본문으로]
255. chauffeur ; (자가용 차·회사차의) 운전사(cf. DRIVER) ;; fem. chauffeuse [본문으로]
256. a[per] head ; 한 사람 당 [본문으로]
257. urbanism ; [U] 1. [미] 도시 생활(학); 도시성 ;; 2. 도시 계획; 도시화 ;; 3. (인구의) 도시 집중 [본문으로]
258. put money into ; ~에 돈을 투자하다 [본문으로]
259. cultivate ; 5. (재능·취미·풍속·습관 등을) 양성하다, (품성을) 세련하다(develop, refine)(⇨ cultivated). ;; 6. (사람을) 교화하다, 계발(啓發)하다(enlighten), …에게 교양을 갖게 하다. ;; 7. (예술·학술 등을) 장려하다, …의 발달[조성(助成)]에 힘쓰다(foster). [본문으로]
260. value judgement ; [명사] (때로 못마땅함) 가치 판단 ;; a judgement about something that is based on somebody's personal opinion and not on facts [본문으로]
261. accomplish ; [타동사][VN] 완수하다, 성취하다, 해내다 [본문으로]
262. ridicule ; [타동사][VN] 비웃다, 조롱[조소]하다 [본문으로]
263. stagnate ; [v] 1. 침체되다, 부진해지다 ;; 2. 고이다, (고여서) 썩다 [본문으로]
264. hence ; 1. 따라서, 이 때문에, 그러므로(*주로 상용문·법률 문서·계약서 등에 쓰인다). ;; 동의어 THEREFORE ;; 2. 지금으로부터, 향후. [본문으로]
265. strive for ; …을 얻으려고 노력하다. [본문으로]
266. sincerity ; 성실, 성의, 정직(honesty), 표리가 없음(genuineness). [본문으로]
267. antidote ; 1. 해독제 ;; 2. (악영향 등의) 교정(矯正) 수단, 대책, 해결 방법 ((to, for, against)) ;; 미국식 [|ӕntidoʊt] 영국식 [|ӕntidəʊt] [본문으로]
268. bombast ; [U] (격식) 겉만 번드르르한 말 ;; 호언장담(tall talk), 허풍, 과장 [본문으로]
269. have in common ; 공통적으로 가지고 있다, 공통점이 있다 [본문으로]
270. prospect ; 1. [U , sing.] ~ (of sth/of doing sth) | ~ (that…) (어떤 일이 있을) 가망[가능성] ;; 3. [pl.] prospects ~ (for/of sth) (성공할) 전망 [본문으로]
271. regulate ; 1. 규제하다, 단속하다, 통제하다 ;; 2. <수량·정도·기계를> 조절[조정]하다, 정리하다 ;; 3. 규칙적이 되게 하다, 질서 정연하게 하다 [본문으로]
272. activism ; 1. (정치적 목적을 위한) 행동주의 ;; 2. [철학] 능동주의; 활동주의 [본문으로]
273. openness ; [U] 1. 솔직함 ;; 2. 마음이 열려 있음, 편협하지 않음 ;; 3. (막히거나 가려져 있지 않고) 열려[트여] 있음 [본문으로]
274. selling point ; (판매 때의) 상품의 강조점, (상품·사람의) 셀링 포인트 ;; (상품이 지닌) 장점 [본문으로]
275. turn sb/sth (from sth) into sth ;; ~을 (~에서) ~이 되게 하다[~으로 바꿔 놓다] [본문으로]
276. resemble ; [타동사] 1. (외관·성질 등이) …을 닮다, …과 비슷하다, …과 공통점이 있다(be like or similar to). [본문으로]
277. brainpower ; [U] 지적 능력, 지능 [본문으로]
278. watch + O + 동사원형 [본문으로]
279. in real time ; 즉시, 동시에 [본문으로]
280. crowdfund ; (transitive) To fund (a project) by having many individuals pool their money together, usually via the Internet. [본문으로]
281. parallel ; 2. <목적·경향 등이> 서로 같은; 같은 방향의; 같은 종류의, 비슷한 [본문으로]
282. extort ; [타동사][VN] ~ sth (from sb) 갈취하다 [본문으로]
283. rent ; [U, C] 1. 지대(地代), 소작료; 집세, 방세; (기계·설비의) 임대료, 사용료. ;; 2. (경제) (부동산의) 수익. [본문으로]
284. clash ; 2. ARGUE | [자동사][V] ~ (with sb) (over/on sth) 의견 충돌을 일으키다, 언쟁을 벌이다 ;; 3. BE DIFFERENT | [자동사][V] ~ (with sth) (신념・생각・성격 등이) 충돌하다, 차이를 보이다 [본문으로]
285. drugpusher ; (구어) 마약 밀매(密賣)자 ((drug peddler[dealer]라고도 함)) [본문으로]
286. be plated with police protection ; 흐름상 "경차의 비호를 받다" 정도의 의미 [본문으로]
287. raid ; 1. (점령할 목적이 아니라 상대방에게 타격을 주기 위한 갑작스런) 습격, 급습, 기습; 공습(= air ~) ((on, upon)) [본문으로]
288. go viral ; 입소문이 나다 [본문으로]
289. back off ; 1. 뒤로 물러나다[뒷걸음질치다] ;; 2. (비난·위협·귀찮게 하기 등을) 그만두다 [본문으로]
290. lift ; 3. (신분의) 향상, 승진, 출세[in]. [본문으로]
291. spook ; (口)유령, 도깨비(ghost, specter); (口)괴짜, 기인(奇人); (俗)GHOSTWRITER; (俗)스파이, 비밀 공작원, 밀정; (俗)정신과 의사; (美俗·경멸)검둥이(Negro); (美學俗)뚱한 녀석, 비위를 맞추기가 싫은 놈 [본문으로]
292. turn ; 5. …의 방향[위치]을 바꾸다 ; (…쪽으로) 향하다, 돌리다(direct) ; (주의 따위를) 집중시키다, 돌리다(direct, concentrate) ; (용도·목적으로) 돌리다. [본문으로]
293. ideological ; [형용사] 사상적인, 이념적인 [본문으로]
294. destabilize ; [타동사][VN] (체제・국가・정부 등을) 불안정하게 만들다 ;; 참고 ; stabilize [본문으로]
295. subject sb/sth to sth ; (흔히 수동태로) ~로 하여금 ~을 당하게[겪게/시달리게] 만들다 [본문으로]
296. humiliation ; 1. 창피 줌[당함] ;; 2. 굴욕, 굴복; 창피, 면목 없음 [본문으로]
297. taser ; [타동사]〔사람〕을 테이저 총으로 쏘다[마비시키다]. [본문으로]
298. FSB가 officer 앞에 있음에도, 관사 a가 아니라 an을 사용한것을 확인 [본문으로]
299. ultra- ; [접두사] (형용사・명사에서) <‘극도로', ‘초(超)[과(過)]-' 등의 뜻을 나타냄> ;; 참고 ; infra- [본문으로]
300. be charged ; 피소, 기소, 고소되다 [본문으로]
301. be dismissed ; 해고, 파면, 면직되다, 쫓겨나다 [본문으로]
302. impunity ; [U] (격식 못마땅함) 처벌을 받지 않음 [본문으로]
303. reverse ; 4. <주의·결정 등을> 역전시키다, 번복하다; [법] 파기하다, 취소하다 [본문으로]
304. take[have] precedence over[of] ; …보다 우위에 서다, 우선하다. [본문으로]
305. incompetent ; 무능한, 부적격의[for, to do, for[at] doing]; 〈법률〉 무자격의, 무능력의. ;; 동의어 ; INCAPABLE [본문으로]
306. immoral ; 1. 부도덕한 ; 음란한, 품행이 나쁜(unchaste, loose)(cf. nonmoral, unmoral ; opp. moral 2). ;; 2. (책·영화·그림 따위가) 미풍양속을 해치는(obscene). [본문으로]
307. idol ; 3. (맹목적으로) 숭배[우상시]되는 사람[것], 숭배물, 아이돌; 본보기, 모범. [본문으로]
308. resentful ; [형용사] ~ (of/at/about sth) 분해[억울해] 하는, 분개하는 [본문으로]
309. pretence (英) (美 pre・tense) ; 1. [U , sing.] ~ (of sth/of doing sth) | ~ (that…) …인 체[척]함, 가식 ;; 2. [U , C] ~ (to sth/to doing sth) (주로 단수로 격식 또는 문예체) (특정한 자질・재능이 있다는) 주장, 과시 [본문으로]
310. cynicism ; 1. 냉소, 비꼬는 버릇; 비꼬는 말 ;; 2. [C~] 견유(犬儒)주의, 냉소주의, 시니시즘(cf. CYNIC 2) [본문으로]
311. staple ; 4. (한 국가의) 주요 산물 ;; 5. ~ (of sth) 주요소, 주성분 [본문으로]
312. crave ; 1. 간청하다, 간절히 바라다(ask earnestly, beg for). ;; 2. 갈망하다, 열망하다(long or yearn for). ;; 3. (사물·사정이 …을) 요(구)하다(call for, demand, require). [본문으로]
313. conviction ; 2. [C , U] ~ (that…) (강한) 신념[의견] [본문으로]
314. cast[take, have] a ballot ; 투표하다, 표를 던지다. [본문으로]
315. by[in] contrast ; (《앞 문장을 받아》) 그에 반해서, 그와 대조적으로 [본문으로]
316. ballot paper ; 투표용지 [본문으로]
317. scribble ; 1. ~ (sth) | ~ sth down 갈겨쓰다, 휘갈기다 ;; 2. [자동사][V + adv. / prep.] 낙서하다 [본문으로]